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THE SEEDS OF CHANGE:  
POPULAR PROTESTS AS 
CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENTS 
JULIANO ZAIDEN BENVINDO 
Bruce Ackerman’s influential theory of “dualist democracy” posits 
that in American history some extraordinary moments of constitution-
making are “constitutional moments,” distinguishable from other periods 
of ordinary lawmaking.  What is missing from the Ackermanian account 
of constitutional moments, however, is a deeper appreciation of the nature 
of popular protests, specifically that they may sometimes constitute the 
core of a constitutional moment, but on other occasions, they may serve 
as a very different inflection point in the evolution of a constitutional 
democracy.  Up until now, the legal literature has not devoted much 
attention to such application of Ackerman’s theory.  In this Article, I 
refine the theory of constitutional moments by drawing from some 
relevant mass protests around the world—“Occupy Wall Street” in the 
United States in 2011, the “Indignados” in Spain in 2011, “The Protests of 
May” in France in 1968, and especially “The Protests of June 2013” 
during the FIFA Confederations Cup in Brazil—to expose the 
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paradoxical nature of constitutional precommitments and how social 
uprisings form, and sometimes fail, to try to remake them.  As the seeds of 
change, this Article concludes that those popular protests are 
constitutional moments, but not those constitutional moments the legal 
literature is so fascinated by.  
 
I.   INTRODUCTION .................................................................................. 364 
II.   CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENTS PROSAICALLY INTERPRETED:  
   THE PARADOX OF PRECOMMITMENTS ........................................... 370 
A. Conceptions of Constitutional Moments ................................... 370 
B. The Matter of Legitimacy and the Matter of Institutional 
Dialogue with the Citizenry ........................................................ 384 
C. The Prosaic Nature of Precommitments and the Paradoxical 
Nature of Constitutional Democracy ......................................... 386 
D. The Prosaic Nature of Precommitments and the Fragility of 
Self-Binding .................................................................................. 394 
E. The Stabilizing Behavior of Constitutions................................. 405 
F. The Paradoxical Nature of Constitutional Moments ................ 409 
III.   POPULAR PROTESTS AS CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENTS? ............... 412 
A. Introduction .................................................................................. 412 
B. The Popular Protests of 2013 in a Comparative Perspective: 
When Constitutional Moments Face the Systemic Analysis ..... 414 
C. The Other Side of the Story: The Matter of Legitimacy and  
 the Matter of Institutional Dialogue with the Citizenry ............ 421 
IV.   CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 424 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Bruce Ackerman’s influential theory of “constitutional moments,”1 
although focusing on American history,2 has grown wings and caught the 
attention of numerous scholars worldwide who have applied it to their 
own realities.3  His straightforward and persuasive narrative of how 
some moments of constitutional history are more special than others has 
become a normative parameter to evaluate a variety of events in 
different parts of the world.4  Distinguished constitutionalists have 
 
1.  See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 3–33 (1991). 
2.  See id. at 32–33 (arguing that “America is a dualist democracy” and comparing with 
other constitutional realities). 
3.  See infra Part II.A. 
4.  See infra Part II.A. 
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interpreted their own realities through the eyes of Ackerman’s 
constitutional moments, and a legion of supporters and critics have 
provided a rich debate over the main aspects of his arguments.5  
However, despite its relevance and brilliance, his theory does not deeply 
delve into a special type of event that may put some of the premises of 
his concept of constitutional moments in doubt: popular protests whose 
outcomes are paradoxical.  For example, history has shown that 
congressional elections held in the aftermath of mass protests tend to 
yield a conservative backlash, clearly contradicting many of the claims 
of those protests.6  France in 1968 (Protests of May), Spain in 2011 (the 
“Indignados”), the United States in 2011 (Occupy Wall Street), and 
Brazil in 2014 (Protests of June 2013) show this paradox between social 
uprisings claiming a new future and the traditional politics clinging to 
the past.7  With these contradictory outcomes, could they be 
constitutional moments?  In this Article, I contend that mass protests as 
such can be interpreted as constitutional moments, even if they 
seemingly do not further lasting structural changes in constitutionalism.  
Moreover, I argue that, when those popular uprisings are deeply 
examined, the concept of constitutional moments should be radically 
reconstructed and demystified. 
Little has been done to associate mass protests as such with the idea 
of constitutional moments.  In fact, constitutional theorists have all but 
ignored this association, stressing instead the values of those normative 
criteria to assess distinct events of their constitutional realities.8  Usually 
related to a set of incredible moments of superior lawmaking, when 
individuals and institutions interact with each other to radically change 
constitutionalism,9 it may sound meaningless to connect the idea of 
constitutional moments to events such as those mass protests.  After all, 
when a particular event does not comply with the normative criteria to 
qualify for a constitutional moment, it becomes less attractive and is 
 
5.  See infra Part II.A. 
6.  Juliano Zaiden Benvindo, Brazilian Elections and Demonstrations of June 2013: The 
Rise of Conservatism?, INT’L J. CONST. L. BLOG (Nov. 1, 2014), 
http://www.iconnectblog.com/2014/11/brazilian-elections-and-demonstrations-of-june-2013-th
e-rise-of-conservatism/ [https://perma.cc/ASZ4-7LWC] (arguing that, paradoxically, history 
shows that, after popular protests, it is not rare for conservative backlashes to occur, 
contradicting thereby many of the claims those mass protests raise). 
7.  Id.  
8.  See infra Part II.A. 
9.  See id. 
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normally set aside.  What is left unexplained is that many of those mass 
protests, even though not complying with those normative criteria, can 
directly or indirectly impact constitutionalism and pave the way for 
relevant social and political changes.  Those protests normally spur 
valuable debates over the necessary changes in society and in 
constitutional democracy.10  Moreover, like most of the literature 
discussing constitutional moments, many of those protests also 
encourage an emotional engagement of the citizenry and possibly some 
institutional responses to make those changes a reality.11  On their bases 
at least, the connection between those mass protests and the theory of 
constitutional moments seems feasible.  Yet, because those mass 
protests die down and seemingly no structural change occurs, many 
could argue that they are not constitutional moments at all.  This Article 
fills this gap by connecting the debate over the concept of constitutional 
moments with those commonly overlooked popular uprisings. 
Bruce Ackerman brings a normative argument for qualifying an 
event as a constitutional moment based on a careful interpretation of 
American history.12  There is a search for the fundamental criteria that 
makes a reality a special event not compared to any other or, at least, 
only compared to few others.13  His dualist model of democracy is 
anchored in differentiating the moments of higher lawmaking—those 
constitutional moments—from the moments of ordinary lawmaking.14  
My argument goes, however, in the other direction.  I shall discuss the 
idea of constitutional moments with a more prosaic viewpoint.  With 
support of rational choice theory, systemic analysis, and political 
philosophy,15 my purpose is, first, to demystify the concept of 
constitutional moments and, second, to challenge it with those 
overlooked mass protests. 
For this purpose, this Article will comparatively discuss some 
relevant overlooked examples of mass protests worldwide to challenge 
this traditional theory of constitutional moments and to refine this 
concept.  Among them, one stands out: the Brazilian popular protests of 
June 2013 during the FIFA Confederations Cup.  I shall focus on this 
 
10.  See infra Part II.F. 
11.  See infra Part III. 
12.  See generally 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 1. 
13.  See generally id. at 266–95. 
14.  See generally id. at 3–33. 
15.  See infra Parts II.A–C.  
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case as the main empirical example for my argument based on the 
following reasons: (a) the dimension of that event (over one million 
people in different cities); (b) the claims and their connections with 
changes in the political and constitutional landscape; (c) the rather 
frustrating outcomes at first sight despite the seemingly positive reaction 
of the political system; (d) the immediate conservative backlash, 
especially in the new congress elected; (e) the particularity of being a 
democratic country with relatively stable institutions; and (f) the 
similarity with other mass protests worldwide.16  More important, 
however, is that the constitutional literature interpreted those mass 
protests as if they did not represent a constitutional moment, comparing 
it to other events in history.17  But why are they not constitutional 
moments?  I argue, instead, that not only are they constitutional 
moments but also they contradict some of Bruce Ackerman’s normative 
criteria.  
Furthermore, these empirical examples add relevant inputs for 
comparative analyses, especially regarding the endurance of 
democracies.  After all, those popular protests can both challenge those 
normative criteria and serve as a useful tool for evaluating how 
constitutionalism and its institutions are affected during moments of 
crisis as such.  By using some arguments of systemic analysis,18 we can 
verify whether those mass protests are indeed a threat to democracy or, 
rather, a continuation of a broader constitutional project that might 
strengthen the “performative meaning”19 of the very constitutionalism.  
Even though the outcomes of such popular uprisings are unpredictable, 
they might reveal how these moments can generate—and also be a 
 
16.  See infra Part II.  
17.  See Cristiano Paixão Araújo Pinto et al., Constituinte Exclusiva é Inconstitucional e 
Ilegítima [The Exclusive Constituent Assembly Is Unconstitutional and Illegitimate], 
CONSULTOR JURÍDICO (June 27, 2013), http://www.conjur.com.br/2013-jun-27/proposta-
constituinte-exclusiva-inconstitucional-ilegitima [https://perma.cc/7SJH-UMVW] (arguing 
that Brazil, after those mass protests of 2013, was not facing a constitutional moment able to 
engender changes in the constitutional system outside of the regular procedural rules of 
constitutional amendment). 
18.  See ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE SYSTEM OF THE CONSTITUTION 5 (2011) (arguing 
that constitutional orders are two-level systems involving institutions and individuals with 
their complex relationships).  
19.  See Jürgen Habermas, Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of 
Contradictory Principles?, 29 POL. THEORY 766, 775–76 (2001) (claiming that the 
“performative meaning” of the constitution regards to a practice taken place “in the course of 
applying, interpreting, and supplementing constitutional norms,” as it happens when each 
citizen critically review the texts and decisions of the past generations). 
 368 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW 99:363 
result of—an increasing curve of constitutional living and constitutional 
learning.  In this case, even though seemingly not qualified as a 
constitutional moment according to Ackerman’s normative premises, 
they may promote some interactions among individuals and institutions 
that, in the long run, foster the exercise of political freedoms and 
reinforce the integrity of institutions.  In short, they can show the 
pedagogical value of democracy. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  In Part II, I will introduce the 
debate on how the legal literature has applied the concept of 
constitutional moments to examine certain events of distinct 
democracies.  This comparative study will prepare the ground for 
introducing a more prosaic approach of that concept, which will be 
based on what I call the matter of legitimacy and the matter of 
institutional dialogue with the citizenry.  In so doing, my purpose is to 
demystify that concept, thereby showing a more realistic view of political 
change that might better translate what does happen in such overlooked 
popular protests.  After examining how the legal literature has made use 
of the concept of constitutional moments, especially Bruce Ackerman’s 
dualist democracy and its application to distinct constitutional realities,20 
I will confront it with three complementary perspectives.  First, I will 
challenge those conceptions of constitutional moments by stressing the 
prosaic nature of precommitments, thereby showing that, more than 
those normative criteria, constitutional democracy may be what it is 
because of far more prosaic reasons.21  Individuals may believe in 
constitutional democracy simply because it brings them the benefits of 
stability and predictability, enhances cooperative interactions, and 
expands their comfort zones.  In fact, maybe they abide by its norms and 
principles merely because of the inertial effect of time, as the natural 
tendency to leave things alone.  The argument here is that when the 
matter of legitimacy and the matter of institutional dialogue with the 
citizenry are working well together, constitutional democracy turns out 
to be an interesting and strategic choice of political commitment.22  
Therefore, more than the magical aura that stems from some of those 
normative assumptions, I argue that those moments are nothing other 
than political commitments, with all their inherent fragilities, which are, 
in some occasions like those mass protests, directly confronted.  
 
20.  Infra Part II.A. 
21.  Infra Parts II.C–D.  
22.  Infra Part II.E. 
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Paradoxically, however, this fragility is also what makes constitutional 
democracy possible.  
This will lead us to the second perspective, one that examines more 
directly the stabilizing behavior of constitutions.23  In Part II.E, the focus 
is on the premise that the very nature of constitutional democracy as a 
back-and-forth process is not compatible with the idea that some 
moments are more special than others.  The central argument here is 
that the tense and dynamic paradox of constitutional democracy, fragile 
and risky as it is, yields a “performative meaning” that is itself cause and 
consequence of the stability and predictability of constitutional 
democracy.24  This “performative meaning” differs from Ackerman’s 
concept of constitutional moments, as long as it denies the anachronistic 
idea of a temporality that remains above the others.  Rather, it affirms 
the permanent transition of temporalities that constitutional democracy 
is.  Finally, the third and conclusive perspective seeks to discuss those 
constitutional moments as simple periods that remind us how 
constitutional democracy cannot rest on any ground, foundation, or 
causality.  Instead, it should be an ongoing negotiation between the 
reality and the promise constitutional democracy holds, showing how it 
is the very “experience of impossible.”25  As such, those constitutional 
moments are interpreted as simple political commitments full of history, 
violence, and faith.26  In the end, the very notion of constitutional 
moments becomes an aporetic utterance, which naturally says many 
things but not all those things Ackerman’s theory holds.   
In Part III, the central argument will connect the conclusions of the 
previous part with the empirical examples of popular uprisings, mostly 
those protests of June 2013 in Brazil during the FIFA Confederations 
Cup.  Especially through systemic analysis,27 those mass protests, 
empirically examined, will directly challenge many of those premises 
discussed in Part II and, above all, those normative criteria Bruce 
Ackerman’s theory of constitutional moments holds.  The purpose here 
is to focus on how constitutionalism and institutions behave in such 
 
23.  Infra Part II.E. 
24.  Habermas, supra note 19, at 775–76. 
25.  JACQUES DERRIDA, NEGOTIATIONS: INTERVENTIONS AND INTERVIEWS, 1971–
2001 343, 352 (2002) (arguing that any tradition, any legacy—and this applies to constitutional 
democracy—can only be understood as the “experience of the impossible,” which, according 
to him, is what deconstruction means); infra Part II.F. 
26.  Infra Part II.F.  
27.  See infra Part III.B.  
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moments of crisis and how they react to those events.  My goal here is to 
raise a relevant discussion about the endurance of constitutional 
democracies.  Moreover, I aim to bring some interesting insights about 
how those mass protests can cohere with the learning curve of 
democratic life despite their seemingly paradoxical outcomes.  
The minimal ambition of this Article is to remind us that a 
demystified concept of constitutional moments is necessary to capture 
the complexities of those overlooked mass protests.  In the end, by 
challenging the idea of constitutional moments with those popular 
uprisings, I aim to cast doubt on why we still believe in the existence of 
constitutional moments and whether there is any sense at all in still 
insisting on the incredible qualities of such moments.  My goal is to show 
that, even though those moments have a special flavor for whatever 
reason, their symbolic feature might not be enough to explain why and 
how we keep being so enthusiastic about constitutional democracy and 
why and how we strive so hard for making it durable from generation to 
generation.  Some simpler aspects of social life and human behavior 
might have a more relevant role in this aspect.  Those popular 
demonstrations, according to this new argument, are interpreted as 
constitutional moments, but as such, they do not carry that magical aura 
that surrounds Ackerman’s theory.  As the seeds of change, those mass 
protests may prove that a new viewpoint of constitutional moments is 
necessary and relevant.  This Article attempts to provide a new 
perspective for this concept and to show that, when those popular 
uprisings are in play, neither constitutionalism nor our societies, as 
beautiful as they are, could be that romantic. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENTS PROSAICALLY INTERPRETED: THE 
PARADOX OF PRECOMMITMENTS 
A. Conceptions of Constitutional Moments 
Bruce Ackerman is the constitutional scholar who coined the theory 
of constitutional moments, which has had great influence on the 
constitutional literature.28  His argument has received, since the 
introduction of his concept of “dualist democracy” in his article 
 
28.  See Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of 
Bruce Ackerman’s Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REV. 759, 760 (1992) 
(“Ackerman’s incipient formulations of this theory of constitutional moments have attracted 
widespread attention among constitutional law scholars.”). 
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Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law29 and then in his book We the 
People: Foundations,30 such a great amount of criticism31 and support32 
 
29.  See Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 
461 (1989) (“[A] dualist constitution seeks to distinguish between two different kinds of 
decision that may be made in a democracy.  The first is a decision by the American People; 
the second, by their government.”). 
30.  See 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 3–33 (introducing his argument that “America is 
a dualist democracy”).  
31.  See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional 
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1080–82 (2001) (noting that “Ackerman’s theory is of little 
help normatively,” especially “during political events that might turn into a full-fledged 
constitutional moment or might fizzle out at some undetermined point in the future” and, 
even though being a “theory of constitutional revolution,” it does not serve as a “theory of 
constitutional retrenchment”); Walter Dean Burnham, Constitutional Moments and 
Punctuated Equilibria: A Political Scientist Confronts Bruce Ackerman’s We the People, 108 
YALE L.J. 2237, 2239–77 (1999) (bringing a perspective in political science to challenge 
Ackerman’s constitutional moments based on what he calls “punctuated equilibria”); Don 
Herzog, Democratic Credentials, 104 ETHICS 467, 479 (1994) (stressing how Ackerman makes 
use of patriotic rhetoric to sustain his arguments); Klarman, supra note 28, at 792 (arguing 
that, in spite of Ackerman’s important contribution, he fails to discuss the 
countermajoritarian difficulty both in descriptive and in prescriptive ways); Larry Kramer, 
What’s a Constitution for Anyway? Of History and Theory, Bruce Ackerman and the New 
Deal, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 885, 932 (1996) (“Ackerman focuses on generalities and 
abstractions at the expense of the particular and the concrete.”); Daryl J Levinson, Parchment 
and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 704 
(2011) (“[I]t is hard to see any connection between the political norms that might be deemed 
constitutional based on their enactment process or democratic pedigree, and the norms that 
are most deeply entrenched.”); Terrance Sandalow, Abstract Democracy: A Review of 
Ackerman’s We the People, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 309, 337 (1992) (noting that Ackerman, by 
denying the relevance of some decisions such as Griswold, “deprives representative 
institutions of any meaningful role in determining the values to be expressed through 
constitutional law”); Thomas L. Dumm, Books in Review, 20 POL. THEORY 341, 345 (1992) 
(book review) (showing how Ackerman’s dualist democracy fails to address the crisis the 
United States has entered in the last years); Frederick Schauer, Deliberating About 
Deliberation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1187, 1201 (1992) (book review) (noting that “Ackerman’s 
historical approach is puzzling” and that he fails to justify why American history and tradition 
should be “the normative starting point” for interpreting the Constitution); Suzanna Sherry, 
The Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 HARV. L. REV. 918, 933 (1992) (book review) 
(“Ackerman’s theory is merely originalism flying under liberal colors.”). 
32.  See, e.g., Peter L. Lindseth, Law, History, and Memory: “Republican Moments” and 
the Legitimacy of Constitutional Review in France, 3 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 49, 56 (1997) 
(extending the concept of constitutional moments to the “Republican Moments” in France); 
Jonathon W. Penney, Deciding in the Heat of the Constitutional Moment: Constitutional 
Change in the Quebec Secession Reference, 28 DALHOUSIE L.J. 217, 219 (2005) (applying 
Ackerman’s theory of constitutional moments to the Quebec Secession Reference in 
Canada); András Sajó, Constitution Without the Constitutional Moment: A View from the New 
Member States, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 243, 243 (2005) (claiming that the European Constitution 
“without the blessing of a constitutional moment” is particularly problematic in Eastern 
Europe); Neil Walker, The Legacy of Europe’s Constitutional Moment, 11 CONSTELLATIONS 
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that no one could deny the large impact of his thoughts on 
contemporary legal thinking.  His main thesis is that, in American 
history, there are some extraordinary moments in which people get 
actively involved in the definition and construction of the meaning of 
the Constitution.33  This popular involvement results in serious 
constitutional transformations and effective constitutional amendments, 
even though they are not necessarily the consequence of the procedure 
described in Article V of the Constitution of the United States of 
America.34  These rare periods differ from the daily “normal politics,” 
which Ackerman associates more directly with the decisions made by the 
government (and not the people as in those special moments),35 whose 
authority is controlled by the very features of the dualist Constitution,36 
and so by the American people and the decisions they had made during 
those constitutional moments.   
Ackerman’s theory is undoubtedly intriguing.  First, because he 
needs to introduce a credible argument to sustain the premise that those 
moments—normal and higher lawmaking—strongly differ one from the 
other.  Notwithstanding his brilliant and straightforward narrative, this is 
not a simple task, and indeed one could even say an impossible one.37  
For the empirical research, as exhaustive and inevitably controversial as 
it is,38 will demand a normative dimension, which is also an arena for the 
 
368, 368–79 (2004) (using “Ackerman’s path-breaking analysis of the history of American 
constitutionalism” to examine European constitutionalism); see also Richard Albert, 
Nonconstitutional Amendments, 22 CAN. J.L. JURIS. 5, 20 (2009) (arguing that, although 
Ackerman’s theory “has attracted considerable criticism,” “one need not rely on the 
Ackermanian theory of constitutional moments to accept that the United States adheres to 
the political model of constitutional amendment”).  
33.  Klarman, supra note 28, at 759–60. 
34.  U.S. CONST. art. V.  
35.  Ackerman associates those constitutional moments to “decisions made by the 
People,” while the concept of “normal politics” relates to “decisions made by the 
government.”  This is the core of his “dualist democracy.”  1 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 6. 
36.  Id. 
37.  Indeed, as Mark Tushnet says, “formal criteria by definition cannot precisely 
identify all and only constitutional moments.”  Mark Tushnet, Living in a Constitutional 
Moment?: Lopez and Constitutional Theory, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 845, 859 (1996). 
38.  See Daniel Taylor Young, How Do You Measure a Constitutional Moment? Using 
Algorithmic Topic Modeling to Evaluate Bruce Ackerman’s Theory of Constitutional Change, 
122 YALE L.J. 1990, 2053 (2013) (indicating, through an impressive statistical process which 
examined U.S. newspapers during the debate over the ratification process of the Fourteenth 
Amendment (1866–1884), that his findings “are consistent with the predictions of Ackerman’s 
theory that sustained popular attention to constitutional politics peaks during transformative 
constitutional moments and then declines as normal politics once again take center stage”).  
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most complex theoretical disputes.  Ackerman is compelled to deliver 
some of these normative premises to make his thesis credible.39  
According to him, in order for a moment to be qualified as a 
constitutional moment, it must pass through four stages.40  First, there is 
the “signaling phase,” wherein whoever is proposing the change must 
have a broad, serious, and deep support of the American people to the 
initiative.41  Usually, as history shows, but not necessarily, the President 
takes this role of claiming the popular support for constitutional 
change.42  Second, this momentum for change must be channeled 
through solid proposals, providing concrete directives for public 
deliberation.43  Third, there must be fair opportunity for 
counterarguments and possible resistance among the different branches 
of the government, paving the way for conflicting political opinions so 
that the support of the majority of the people results from careful 
decision making.44  Fourth and finally, as a consequence of this “broad 
and deep” popular support for constitutional change, the victorious 
political position must be “translated” into constitutional principles that 
will determine the functioning of constitutionalism in the future, forcing 
all the resisting branches of the government, especially the Court,45 to 
promote what he calls a “switch-in-time” in their opinions.46  
Particularly, three moments in U.S. history can be described as 
following those criteria, according to Ackerman: (a) the Founding, when 
the Constitution was drafted despite the violation of the Articles of 
Confederation; (b) Reconstruction, right after the Civil War, when the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments were created through some 
type of coercion and, therefore, without authentic approval of state 
assemblies; and (c) the New Deal, during which, after a long battle 
 
39.  See 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 48–49, 266–69, 272–90.  
40.  Id. at 266–67. 
41.  Id. at 266, 272–80. 
42.  See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 37, at 848 (“There seems to be no reason to insist that 
signals or proposals emanate solely from the President.”). 
43.  See 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 266–67, 280–84. 
44.  Id. at 266–67, 285–88. 
45.  Ackerman argues that the U.S. Supreme Court undertakes a “preservationist” role 
of the People’s will, according to what is expressed during the moments of higher lawmaking.  
In his view, this would overcome the countermajoritarian difficulty.  See id. at 43, 315–16.  
This assertion obviously does not come without serious criticisms.  See Klarman, supra note 
28, at 792–797 (claiming that he sees no criteria whatsoever in Ackerman’s conservative view 
of this Court’s “preservationist role”).  
46.  See 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 266–67, 288–90. 
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between Franklin Roosevelt and the Supreme Court, we could observe 
the “switch-in-time” of the Court and the birth of its “transformative 
opinions” in favor of the President’s policies.47  In each one of these 
moments, Ackerman delivers a detailed explanation to demonstrate that, 
in American history, there is a creative and republican48 mobilization of 
fellow citizens that makes the constitutional change into a practice that 
is not bound to a certain procedure as the one established in Article V.49  
This formality is thus replaced by a narrative of popular involvement 
and institutional arrangement strong enough to legitimize, as 
constitutional amendments as any other, the Supreme Court’s “switch-
in-time” during the New Deal or other similar mobilization to be seen in 
the coming times.50  
The problem is that the normative premises Ackerman brings 
forward could be attacked in their core elements.  There is no simple 
explanation in those premises as to what makes a period of higher 
lawmaking—and especially those three51—strictly distinct from the one 
of normal lawmaking,52 and also there is no “good account”53 of why 
 
47.  See id. at 282. 
48.  There are some criticisms about the association of Ackerman’s theory with 
republicanism.  E.g., James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular 
Power in the American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 304–05 (1990). 
49.  See U.S. CONST. art. V; 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 37–50. 
50.  See 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 289. 
51.  See Pope, supra note 48, at 305 (“Professor Ackerman has come to praise 
republicanism only to bury it.  His theory celebrates a system that has produced only three 
constitutional moments in two centuries, and two of those involved full-scale warfare.  
Ackerman’s three moments are not, however, intended as a comprehensive list of popular 
republican periods.”); see also Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten Constitutional Moment, 
11 CONST. COMMENT. 115, 116 (1994) (sustaining the existence of a fourth constitutional 
moment from 1877 to 1954, which he calls “the forgotten constitutional moment”).  
52.  See Jack Balkin and his connection of a living constitution with redemptive 
constitutionalism, according to which the real transformations of the Constitution are not 
limited to some periods of higher lawmaking, but they are instead the result of the “processes 
of constitutional development produced by the interaction of the courts with the political 
branches” in different times of American history.  JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 
297 (2011).  Mark Tushnet also argues that “[t]he judgments made by representatives during 
periods of ordinary politics and by the People during constitutional moments are, in short, 
simply different judgments.  They implicate different characteristics of situations of choice, 
but each characteristic is relevant to sound decision-making.”  Tushnet, supra note 37, at 854 
(emphasis in original); see also Herzog, supra note 31, at 471 (noting that Ackerman’s 
dichotomy between normal and constitutional politics diverge in distinct contexts and cannot 
capture every reality); Klarman, supra note 28, at 769, 791 (arguing that Ackerman’s dualist 
democracy distorts constitutional history); Kramer, supra note 31, at 895 (“Ackerman’s 
theory still seems weak.”); Schauer, supra note 31, at 1194–95 (“[Ackerman] fails to come to 
grips with the political and constitutional import of shifts in background understandings that 
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history and traditions must be the basis, particularly in the way as 
described,54 for constructing some normative assumptions that will guide 
how the Constitution is to be interpreted.  Indeed, this focus on dualism, 
founded on specific moments of American history, might simplify the 
inherent complexity of constitutionalism,55 which is based on a “far more 
fluid, complex process.”56  
Even more serious, his narrative seems to be anchored to the idea 
that the people during those superior moments behave as if they were 
oriented to the common welfare in a way that they would forego their 
individual interests for the sake of the community,57 regardless of all the 
profound divisions of society.58  In addition to setting aside the common 
interested behavior of human beings in different aspects of private and 
social life, and necessarily pointing out the self-interested behavior of 
“ordinary” politics as inferior to the people’s altruistic choices in those 
constitutional moments,59  Ackerman’s assumptions go further to the 
point of expressing the idea of deliberation as something so special as to 
be “a sufficient condition for constitutional transformation,”60 bringing 
about an ideal of deliberation that might not correspond whatsoever to 
 
do not meet these criteria.”). 
53.  See Schauer, supra note 31, at 1201 (arguing that Ackerman does not provide a good 
account of why history and traditions should be the normative basis for interpreting the 
Constitution). 
54.  See Kramer, supra note 31, at 897 (showing that Ackerman defines “the tradition at 
a level of generality so high as to make comparative evaluation difficult”). 
55.  As Larry Kramer affirms, “Ackerman focuses on generalities and abstractions at the 
expense of the particular and the concrete.”  Id. at 932.  In the same way Suzanna Sherry 
argues that “[t]his part of the book detracts from Ackerman’s real contribution by combining 
weak analysis with sloppy history.”  Sherry, supra note 31, at 923. 
56.  See Sandalow, supra note 31, at 324. 
57.  See Klarman, supra note 28, at 764 (questioning how Ackerman “portray[s] these 
historical episodes as moments of suspended self-interest”). 
58.  See Herzog, supra note 31, at 470 (showing how profoundly divided is American 
society and how these differences play a special role in distinct moments of law and 
constitutional-making). 
59.  There is the simple assumption that a non-interested behavior is superior to the self-
interested one, which is a controversial assertion.  See Tushnet, supra note 37, at 853 
(“[T]here is simply no good reason to accept that assertion or its supporting ground.”); 
Schauer, supra note 31, at 1197 (criticizing Ackerman’s reliance on “the virtues of 
deliberation”).  Furthermore, according to Michal Klarman, Ackerman sees the “modern 
system of constitutional change,” as it happened in the New Deal, as superior to that one 
described in Article V of the Constitution of the United States.  Klarman, supra note 28, at 
767–68. 
60.  Schauer, supra note 31, at 1197. 
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the “darker side of public political life.”61  Political commitments, after 
all, are much more fragile than those words seem to express and can last 
for a long time not because they have a sort of entrenchment stemmed 
from the special qualities of such constitutional moments but simply 
because people are not in the mood to make changes (either because 
there is no political opposition or simply because most of the people 
agree with how reality goes on).62  
Finally, there seems to be a significant intergenerational 
conservatism in Ackerman’s point of view insofar as, for him, the present 
time, when ordinary politics takes place, is rather bound to the people’s 
voice expressed during those constitutional moments, whose role of 
preservation is addressed to the Court.63  There is the premise that the 
people’s voice, as magical and uninterested but unclear as it is, is 
superior to today’s voice, with all the risks of anachronism involved in 
this presupposition,64 as well as all the risks of simplifying the debate 
over institutional design and separation of powers.65  There is here 
 
61.  Id. at 1188; see also Herzog, supra note 31, at 470–75 (ironizing some of Ackerman’s 
assumptions by relating them to complicated periods of American history); Klarman, supra 
note 28, at 770 (“Once Ackerman abandons his own constraining criteria, he opens himself up 
to the criticism that every historical episode of mass popular mobilization arguably qualifies 
to a constitutional moment.”).  
62.  Levinson, supra note 31, at 702 (“If popular majorities ever change their minds 
about these issues, then Ackerman’s ‘constitutional’ commitments will dissolve.  There has 
been no obvious process of political entrenchment that would make these commitments more 
stable than the first-order political preferences they reflect.”). 
63.  See Klarman, supra note 28, at 765 (“[F]undamentally conservative nature of the 
dualist democracy thesis . . . .”); Sherry, supra note 31, at 934 (“[O]ne of modern liberalism’s 
most forceful spokesmen is reduced to this last resort of conservatives.”). 
64.  See Klarman, supra note 28, at 765–66 (“Ackerman is no less conservative (and 
wrongheaded) than those constitutional theorists who contend that the countermajoritarian 
problem is an illusion.”). 
65.  For Ackerman, the countermajoritarian difficulty, which is a central debate over 
legitimacy in constitutionalism, is an illusion.  As long as we understand the dualist nature of 
American constitutionalism, there is no sense anymore in discussing this matter.  In this case, 
the Supreme Court acts to preserve the people’s voice expressed during the periods of higher 
lawmaking.  In his words: 
[T]he dualist will view the Supreme Court from a very different perspective than the 
monist.  The monist treats every act of judicial review as presumptively 
antidemocratic and strains to save the Supreme Court from the 
“countermajoritarian difficulty” by one or another ingenious argument.  In contrast, 
the dualist sees the discharge of the preservationist function by the courts as an 
essential part of a well-ordered democratic regime.  Rather than threatening 
democracy by frustrating the statutory demands of the political elite in Washington, 
the courts save democracy by protecting the hard-won principles of a mobilized 
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maybe, as Mark Tushnet points out, an “overly celebratory” 
interpretative narrative of national identity,66 which might have made 
him overlook, in some way, how institutions and the people themselves 
really behave in their day-to-day political life.67  
His provocative narrative, at any rate, has produced some other 
analyses that attempted to adapt those criteria to other realities, even 
though Ackerman’s theory is strictly based on American history.  Indeed, 
his project is, for him, so American that he says that, more than 
borrowing arguments from foreign thinkers and because “[Americans] 
have also built a genuinely distinctive pattern of constitutional thought 
and practice,”68 the investigation is to be made “without the assistance of 
guides imported from another time and place.”69  Therefore, those 
projects using Ackerman’s theory to apply to other countries and 
contexts are rather an adjustment of his idea of constitutional moments, 
with all the inherent difficulties in this task.70  This is, for instance, what 
Jonathon W. Penney does in allusion to Canada,71 where he sees, 
 
citizenry against erosion by political elites who have failed to gain broad and deep 
popular support for their innovations.  
1 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 10.  Against this viewpoint, see Sherry, supra note 31, at 929 
(“Without a means of separating constitutional politics from normal politics, Ackerman’s 
directive that the Court preserve the will of the people (as reflected in times of constitutional 
politics) from governmental attempts to subvert it (in times of normal politics) becomes 
meaningless.”); Jeremy Waldron, Bruce Ackerman: We the People: Volume I, Foundations, 
90 J. PHIL. 149, 153 (1993) (book review) (“Even if one concedes the superior authority of 
Ackerman’s higher law making, one is left unsure why it should be the special function of the 
courts to interpret that legislation.”). 
66.  See Tushnet, supra note 37, at 855; see also Herzog, supra note 31, at 479 
(contending that Ackerman’s theory is marked by rhetoric). 
67.  See Dumm, supra note 31, at 343 (“[F]or those who worry that it means an alienated 
disengagement by the citizenry from higher politics as a consequence of the intense 
corruption of political life, Ackerman’s faith seems overly optimistic to the point of 
naïveté.”). 
68.  1 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 3. 
69.  Id.  
70.  See Mark Tushnet, Misleading Metaphors in Comparative Constitutionalism: 
Moments and Enthusiasm, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 262, 262 (2005) (claiming that Ackerman’s 
theory “might not be related conceptually, or related empirically in other national settings”).  
71.  Penney knows the difficulty of this task of using Ackerman’s premises in Canada, 
but even so, he is a clear enthusiast of this possibility.  According to him: 
There are, of course problems with using a theory based on unique aspects of 
American history to discuss Canadian constitutionalism.  Still, Ackerman’s historical 
approach to constitutionalism provides a “bridge” between Canadian and American 
traditions, as his theory has been likened to the “living tree” doctrine of 
constitutional development so prominent in Canada. 
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especially in regards to the Quebec Secession Reference, “events 
surrounding the decision [that], for the most part, can be understood to 
involve a ‘constitutional moment,’”72 associating this moment to a 
“‘switch-in-time’ by the Supreme Court of Canada.”73  Sujit Choudhry 
also investigates the same event, identifying it with the idea of 
Ackerman’s constitutional moments, although in a critically 
reinterpreted approach.74 
We can observe similar movements from authors investigating 
constitutional realities whose backgrounds are largely distinct from the 
one in the United States.  Peter L. Lindseth is a very interesting example 
of someone who attempts to connect Ackerman’s criteria to what he 
calls “republican moments” in France, identifying them with the role of 
constitutional review in that country.75  Particularly interesting is how he 
associates those premises to a reality whose constitutional review is 
historically limited and the idea of supremacy of Parliament is a 
longstanding tradition, this one, according to Lindseth, brought to an 
end by a new attitude of French Constitutional Council76 from 197177 
 
Penney, supra note 32, at 219. 
72.  Id. at 220. 
73.  Id. 
74.  Choudhry leaves aside much of Ackerman’s magical aura surrounding those 
constitutional moments and focuses rather on what he sees as Ackerman’s main contribution, 
i.e., “placing illegal moments of regime change at the center of constitutional theory.”  Sujit 
Choudhry, Ackerman’s Higher Lawmaking in Comparative Constitutional Perspective: 
Constitutional Moments as Constitutional Failures?, 6 INT’L J. CONST. L. 193, 210 (2008).  This 
leads to a new interpretation of Ackerman’s premises.  According to him, “Ackerman’s 
constitutional moment, thus reinterpreted, consists of an extralegal constitutional change, 
resorted to because of a failure of the formal rules of constitutional amendment.”  Id. at 214. 
75.  See Lindseth, supra note 32, at 56–57.  In his words:  
Upon close inspection we should begin to see that Professor Ackerman’s concepts 
can also be applied to the French case. . . . [T]he [French] Constitutional Council’s 
decision of July 16, 1971 [which is the turning point in French 
constitutionalism] . . . was an exercise in dualist democracy not unlike judicial review 
in the United States, as Professor Ackerman describes it.  However, the “evolving 
historical practice” that underlines French dualism is not so much expressed in 
constitutions [but] . . . is embodied in an abstract concept of the “Republic” itself. 
Id. 
76.  Id. at 51 (“The Council’s 1971 decision thus brought to an end France’s Rousseauian 
tradition of legislative supremacy and national sovereignty theoretically represented by 
Parliament.”). 
77.  Lindseth mentions that that the French Constitutional Council’s decision of July 16, 
1971, is a turning point in French constitutionalism because, for the first time, the 
Constitutional Council “struck down a piece of legislation—particularly one introduced by 
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onwards.  Moreover, Lindseth puts forward the theory that this Council’s 
decision, following Ackerman’s steps, “arguably evidences this same 
historically preservationist (or mnemonic) function,”78 in such a way that 
it “was able to preserve, legitimately, some of the higher lawmaking 
achievements of France’s most memorable Republican moments, which 
we might now rechristen, in view of the nature of the controlling norms 
to which they gave rise, as constitutional moments.”79  The court 
responsible for exercising constitutional review is, also here, projected to 
a whole new level of making the necessary transformations in 
constitutionalism, preserving thereby the “republican moments” of 
France. 
More recently, the Hungarian Professor András Sajó also used the 
concept of constitutional moments to analyze the project of the 
European Constitution, especially in regards to the post-communist 
countries and examined what he calls “constitutional enthusiasm,” which 
is an idea intimately linked to the idea of “constitutional identity” and 
largely inspired by Ackerman’s premises.80  Here again, there is the 
association of constitutional moments to an emotional engagement of 
the citizenry towards the construction of national—and in this case also 
transnational—identities.  But Sajó goes further by stressing this 
emotional quality to the point of saying that “an emotionally grounded 
identification with the constitution contributes to its unconditional 
‘bindingness’” and also that “it is binding due to an emotionally 
supported and unquestionable sociocultural fact.”81  According to him, 
“[t]he overwhelming majority of the constitutions that we know do not 
have these specificities,”82 which turns out to be a grave disadvantage 
because, “without the blessing of a constitutional moment,”83 those 
constitutions—as the ones in Eastern Europe—lack a “sense of union, or 
the formation of identity, among the members of the society to which it 
applies.”84  “Constitutional enthusiasm” then becomes the antagonist of 
“constitutional alienation,”85 a characteristic that is well visible—either 
 
the Government—for a purported violation of a constitutionally protected right.”  Id. at 50. 
78.  Id. at 59. 
79.  Id. at 80. 
80.  Sajó, supra note 32, at 244–45. 
81.  Id. at 245. 
82.  Id. at 243. 
83.  Id. 
84.  Id. 
85.  Id. at 246. 
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for historical or political reasons—in the East Central European States.86  
In the same way, “constitutional enthusiasm,” recalling somehow 
Ackerman’s moments of higher lawmaking,87 is also capable of 
transforming decisions and other considerations into acts that are “not 
only dictated by interest politics and graft.”88  Once again, there is the 
view of a community engaged in making a new moment, one that is 
characterized by this eagerness to build an “emotionally appealing” 
constitution that identifies itself with the enthusiastic people.89 
This very idea of a community engaged in transforming the reality to 
the point of giving rise to a new constitutional moment is also discussed 
in the form of a societal constitutionalism struggling against the 
contemporary hegemonic economic constitutionalism.  Saki Bailey and 
Ugo Mattei, in a fascinating paper examining the new configuration of 
social movements and more particularly the commons (beni comuni) 
movement in Italy, argue that those social movements have become the 
“new pouvoir constituant as an oppositional force to the process of 
economic constitutionalism imposed by international economic 
institutions.”90  As a model against the liberal constitutionalism, which is 
anchored in the idea of sovereign state, representation, and private 
ownership,91 Bailey and Matttei contend that, in the current scenario of 
rising economic constitutionalism transcending state borders while state 
sovereignty becomes weaker,92 those social movements engender a 
reconfiguration of the concept of sovereignty of the people as well as of 
constituent power by fostering a democratic process taking place “from 
 
86.  Id. 
87.  In any case, Sajó is careful in using Ackerman’s premises and indeed applies them to 
the simple purpose of examining the new context of Europe, and especially of those Eastern 
European countries.  As Tushnet argues:  
I conclude by observing that Professor Sajó avoids many of the pitfalls created by 
Ackerman’s metaphor of constitutional moments.  As I have suggested, he implicitly 
does distinguish among the components of Ackerman’s analysis, and uses only those 
components that are relevant to the questions posed to the European Community’s 
newest members by their accession. 
Tushnet, supra note 70, at 268. 
88.  Sajó, supra note 32, at 246. 
89.  Id. at 245. 
90.  Saki Bailey & Ugo Mattei, Social Movements as Constituent Power: The Italian 
Struggle for the Commons, 20 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 965, 1012 (2013).  
91.  Id.  
92.  Id. at 973. 
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below.”93  Similar to the other examples above, the concept of 
constitutional moment, also using Ackerman’s intuition,94 appears 
strongly connected to this capacity of fellow citizens to create the 
momentum for change but now focusing more directly on how those 
popular protests can bring about a more democratic, participative, and 
egalitarian approach to constitutionalism.  After all, as Mattei sustains in 
another text, “[l]iberal constitutionalism fails to provide a shield against 
private interests without the active constituent role of the people to 
enforce constitutional public purpose guarantees.”95   
In Brazil, the occurrence of a constitutional moment is normally 
identified with the Constitutional Assembly of 1987–1988, when strong 
popular mobilizations claimed a democratic constitution that could 
address the people’s expectations and needs.96  In this respect, we can 
observe some literature connecting that moment to Ackerman’s theory.  
Rodrigo Brandão, for instance, mentions the overwhelming popular 
participation of civil society during that moment, the universalization of 
concepts such as constitutional entrenchment and judicial review, the 
fact there is a constitution drafted in order to consolidate democracy, 
and, finally, its extensive bill of rights as a clear evidence of “the 
adoption of the premise of dualist democracy in Brazil.”97  In the same 
 
93.  Id. at 1007. 
94.  Id. at 966, 975.   
95.  Ugo Mattei, Protecting the Commons: Water, Culture, and Nature: The Commons 
Movement in the Italian Struggle Against Neoliberal Governance, 112 S. ATLANTIC Q. 366, 375 
(2013), http://saq.dukejournals.org/content/112/2/366.full.pdf+html [https://perma.cc/MGH9-
2DFM]. 
96.  As Leonardo Barbosa says, in certainly one the most brilliant analyses of the 
Brazilian recent constitutional history:  
The constituent process of 1987–1988 tells a story according to which it is not 
possible to clearly consider this moment of self-reflection.  A reflection which was 
not merely undertaken by the Framers, but which was genuinely carried out by the 
Brazilian society. . . . [The Constitution is the result of] a long process of maturation 
achieved by the claim for a new Constitution throughout the whole 70’s and half of 
80’s.  The convening is not a magnanimous and condescending gesture of the 
President of the Republic, but rather the result of a set of claims which, for more 
than fifteen years, have interpenetrate—and converged on—the established political 
power. . . . [Besides], the convening provided a valuable opportunity of articulation 
between Congress and civil society.  
LEONARDO AUGUSTO DE ANDRADE BARBOSA, HISTÓRIA CONSTITUCIONAL BRASILEIRA: 
MUDANÇA CONSTITUCIONAL, AUTORITARISMO E DEMOCRACIA NO BRASIL PÓS-1964 
[BRAZILIAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY: CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, 
AUTHORITARIANISM AND DEMOCRACY IN BRAZIL AFTER 1964] 246 (2012). 
97.  Rodrigo Brandão, Rigidez Constitucional e Pluralismo Político [Constitutional 
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way, Daniel Sarmento, also making reference to Ackerman, places 
particular emphasis on this popular mobilization during the 
Constitutional Assembly, arguing that “the country experienced a typical 
‘constitutional moment,’ characterized by the political effervescence and 
genuine popular mobilization in favor of a new ‘beginning.’”98  Even in a 
recent polemic case judged by the Brazilian Supreme Court,99 one of its 
Justices, Luiz Fux, mentioned that “the Constitution of 1988 was 
promulgated in an environment of large popular mobilization.  There 
was between 1987 and 1988 a ‘constitutional moment,’ to use an 
expression also coined by Ackerman.”100  
Actually, the relevance of the concept of constitutional moment in 
reference to the Brazilian Constitutional Assembly of 1987–1988 is so 
central that many scholars employ it—either with direct reference to 
Ackerman or not—to examine the constitutionality of a certain bill or 
even a proposal for amendment to the constitution.  For instance, 
Cristiano Paixão, in evaluating a proposed amendment to the 
constitution that would establish a sort of “fast track” procedure 
circumventing the amendment rules as set out in the constitution, raised 
a specific objection to it.101  His argument was that it would dissipate the 
role of the constitution and that “there would be no more constitutional 
moment,” as long as “every moment of politics [would be], potentially, a 
constitutional moment.”102  
The same discussion reappeared right after those mass protests of 
June 2013 in Brazil during the FIFA Confederations Cup.  President 
 
Entrenchment and Political Pluralism], 5 DIREITOS FUNDAMENTAIS E JUSTIÇA 86, 92 (2008).  
In any case, Brandão acknowledges the existence of many private interests at stake.  This is 
why, according to him, “it is wrong to give to the constitutional deliberations the aura of 
sanctity.”  Id. at 93. 
98.  Daniel Sarmento, 21 Anos da Constituição de 1988: A Assembleia Constituinte de 
1987/1988 e a Experiência Constitucional Brasileira sob a Carta de 1988 [21 Years of the 
Constituent Assembly of 1987–1988 and the Brazilian Constitutional Experience Under the 
Constitution of 1988], 30 DPU 7, 12 (2009). 
99.  The case related to a bill introducing new party rules that had just been approved by 
the Chamber of Deputies.  Lei No. 12.875, de 30 de Outubro de 2013, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA 
UNIÃO [D.O.U], de 31.10.2013 (Braz.). 
100.  S.T.F., M.S. N. 32.033, Relator: Min. Gilmar Mendes, 20.06.2013, 190, DIÁRIO DO 
JUDICIÁRIO ELETRÔNICO [D.J.e], 25.06.2013 (Braz.). 
101.  Proposta de Emenda à Constituição No. 157, de 4 de Setembro de 2003, DIÁRIO 
DA CÂMARA DOS DEPUTADOS [D.C.D], 26.09.2003, 50457 (Braz.). 
102.  Cristiano Paixão, A Constituição Subtraída: Inconstitucional e Ilegítima [The 
Subtracted Constitution: Unconstitutional and Illegitimate], CONSTITUIÇÃO & DEMOCRACIA, 
Feb. 5, 2006, at 4. 
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Dilma Rousseff reacted to those demonstrations by presenting an 
agenda of reforms.103  Among them, she attempted to push a political 
reform through a plebiscite, which would authorize what scholars called 
an “exclusive constituent assembly.”104  This “exclusive constituent 
assembly” would introduce a sort of “fast track” procedure of 
constitutional amendment to discuss the political reform that would, 
nevertheless, soften the strict rules for constitutional amendment.105  The 
scholarly and political backlash was immediate, some of them also 
recalling the idea of constitutional moments.  Cristiano Paixão, Juliana 
Neunschwander Magalhães, Marcelo Cattoni, and Vera Karam de 
Chueiri, all very prestigious professors from different universities in 
Brazil, for example, argued that “exclusive constituent assembly” would 
clearly mean the “abandonment of the democratic Constitution 
promulgated on October 5, 1988,”106 especially because, at that very 
moment, there was no reason to disrupt a “history built from several 
struggles and mobilizations of civil society.”107  Gustavo Binenbojm, 
professor of constitutional law at the Rio de Janeiro State University, in 
an interview for Consultor Jurídico, also presented a similar view.108  
According to him, those protests could not be compared to the 
Constituent Assembly of 1987–1988, for, in this case, there is no break 
with the legal order and Brazil lives a democratic regime.109  In other 
words, those mass protests of 2013 were not a constitutional moment as 
was that transition to democracy in 1988.  
 
103.  The plan focused on (1) urban mobility; (2) investment of oil revenue, particularly 
from the pre-salt, to fund education; (3) a program destined to bring in foreign doctors to 
areas lacking physicians; and (4) political reform.  See Marco Sibaja et al., Brazil Protests 2013 
Grow: One Million Brazilians Hit the Streets, WORLD POST (Aug. 21, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/21/brazil-protests-2013_n_3478101.html [https://perm
a.cc/YD3V-EJGA]. 
104.  See Paixão et al., supra note 17. 
105.  According to the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, “the proposal 
[for amendment of the constitution] shall be discussed and voted upon in each House of the 
National Congress, in two readings, and it shall be considered approved if it obtains in both 
readings, three-fifths of the votes of the respective members.”  CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL 
[C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 60, § 2 (Braz.).  
106.  Paixão et al., supra note 17. 
107.  Id. 
108.  See Rafael Baliardo & Rodrigo Haidar, Constituinte Exclusiva é Desnecessária e 
Perigosa [Exclusive Constituent Assembly Is Unnecessary and Dangerous], CONSULTOR 
JURÍDICO (June 24, 2013), http://www.conjur.com.br/2013-jun-24/constituinte-reforma-
politica-desnecessaria-perigosa [https://perma.cc/NY73-XBK8]. 
109.  Id. 
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Therefore, the idea of constitutional moments reaches the most 
distinct contexts and historical events.  Despite the fact that many of 
these events and theories are very particular, which bring difficulties in 
achieving consensus on their premises, it is possible to outline some 
general arguments connecting them.  The following section aims to 
discuss them by stressing what I call the matter of legitimacy and the 
matter of dialogue with the citizenry.   
B. The Matter of Legitimacy and the Matter of Institutional Dialogue 
with the Citizenry 
It is obviously not my goal to restrict the concept of constitutional 
moments to Ackerman’s premises and all the features surrounding it.  
This concept has naturally a much greater scope.110  But some relevant 
aspects can already be extracted from what Ackerman himself calls a 
constitutional moment and the distinct uses the legal literature has made 
 
110.  Other authors will examine the idea of constitutional moments without directly 
making reference to Ackerman’s premises.  James Gray Pope, who is critical of Ackerman’s 
constitutional moments, see Pope, supra note 48, at 304–05, aims to “explore the role of direct 
popular power in general,” id. at 305, and for this purpose, he calls those moments 
“republican moments,” which have some differences to Ackerman’s.  First of all, Pope is less 
incisive as regards to the suspension of private interests during those periods.  For him, in 
“republican moments,” “[t]he everyday liberal priorities of autonomy over community, 
acquisitiveness over civic virtue, and instrumental rationality over moral choice were 
reversed, albeit only partially and temporally.”  Id. at 310–11.  Besides, he places less 
emphasis on the institutional reaction to popular claims and stresses, instead, the movement 
of the citizenry.  According to him, there are five defining features of those “republican 
moments”: 
The first three track the republican-liberal distinction: (1) large numbers of 
Americans engage in serious political discourse; (2) their arguments are couched 
primarily in moral rather than pecuniary terms and appeal to the common good 
rather than private interest; and (3) the subjects of debate include fundamental 
aspects of the social, political, or economic order.  
The last two track the distinction between direct popular power and 
representative politics-as-normal: (4) representative politics are overshadowed by 
extra-institutional forms of citizen participation such as popular assemblies, militant 
protest, and civil disobedience; and (5) social movements and voluntary associations 
displace interest group and political parties as the leading forms of political 
organization. 
Id. at 311.  Accordingly, there is, in his view, a much stronger dualism between citizenry, on 
one hand, and the incapacity of politics to react to popular demands, on the other.  We could 
not call, anyway, his point of view as anti-institutional, but it is certainly one that understands 
periodic direct popular power—against the political anomie that historically paved the way 
for totalitarian forms of government—as a requirement for the rejuvenation of democracy.  
Id. at 323. 
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of it in distinct contexts, as we discussed above.111  First of all, there is 
this close relationship between those moments and the concept of a 
people.  Regardless of whether those people are American, Canadian, 
French, Italian, Brazilian, and so on, the idea of constitutional moment is 
identified with a certain popular engagement for a new time, and also a 
popular commitment to transform the reality.  This is the structural 
cause, which can have its origins catalyzed by a political authority or 
strategy.  However, unless those people support it and claim the change, 
that political authority or strategy alone cannot promote a constitutional 
moment.  A matter of legitimacy and citizenship is in the core of this 
qualification.  
Second, those people, even being the structural cause of 
transformation, cannot make the change alone, for their claim must be 
channeled into institutional mechanisms of decision making.  Indeed, 
none of those approaches imagine the situation of the change being 
made entirely outside of an institutional framework, without this 
meaning that the people cannot make use of extra-institutional forms of 
exercising their citizenship, such as assemblies, civil disobedience, or 
demonstrations, nor that they are controlled or necessary dependent on 
a political system.  Transformation can obviously mean transforming the 
very political system or replacing it with a new one, but at some point, a 
kind of dialogue between the people and the institutions has to take 
place.  A matter of institutional appropriation and subsequent resolution 
of some of those popular claims through institutional mechanisms 
emerges.  Therefore, without entering into the most complex debates 
over the benefits or insufficiencies regarding a specific concept of 
constitutional moment, either Ackerman’s or any other, we can point out 
two main elements therein involved: (1) the matter of legitimacy (and 
naturally citizenship) and (2) the matter of institutional dialogue with 
the citizenry (and obviously the legitimacy of that discourse). 
From these two central elements, the following analysis will address 
the discussion of how they connect to each other in the real practice of 
constitutionalism, trying to deconstruct some of the aura normally 
associated with constitutional moments.  This does not mean that we do 
not envisage those moments as special moments in the different 
worldwide constitutional histories.  No one will deny that Ackerman’s 
constitutional moments, the turning point in constitutionalism in Canada 
and France, the different constitutional movements in Europe, the 
 
111.  Supra Part II.A.  
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Constitutional Assembly of 1987–1988 in Brazil, and so on, represent 
fundamental changes in their respective realities to the point of creating 
a memory of certain temporality that should remain active in our lives.  
Likewise, this does not mean that those moments did not bring a strong 
emotional feeling to the people, who could see that, at that very 
moment, they were also making their own future.112  But, on the other 
hand, as impressive as they are, they are also facts of social life, with all 
the not-so-beautiful aspects of it.  
It is a type of discussion that intends to bring a different approach to 
those moments and see in them a kind of normal behavior of individuals 
who, from time to time, wish to promote a certain change in their 
political institutions, in how people should be represented in their 
interests, in how the government should conduct a political agenda able 
to accomplish popular demands, and in how their rights and duties 
should be interpreted and acknowledged in different aspects of social 
life—in short, in how people and institutions should establish a 
productive dialogue for the sake of their interests and well-being.  After 
all, no constitutional system, as perfect as it might seem, would last long 
without public support.  The matter of legitimacy and the matter of 
institutional dialogue with the citizenry are central here. 
C. The Prosaic Nature of Precommitments and the Paradoxical Nature 
of Constitutional Democracy 
Naturally, when we mention the two elements usually involved in the 
debates over the concept of constitutional moments—the matter of 
legitimacy, on the one hand, and the matter of institutional dialogue with 
the citizenry, on the other—we acknowledge the complexities of terms 
such as legitimacy, institution, and citizenry.  As most of the concepts 
associated with constitutionalism, they are characterized by a certain 
 
112.  In a commentary to a previous draft of this Article, the German legal historian 
Michael Stolleis stressed some other interesting moments when we could observe this 
emotional feeling of constitutional moments in Germany, such as from 1848 to 1849, January 
1919, from September 1948 to May 1949, and naturally 1990.  According to him, during those 
moments, the German people knew that, during that week and those days, many relevant 
decisions about their future were being made and that the “lava was still fluid and would 
presumably cool down soon.”  Other examples he pointed out are the drafting of the 
Norwegian Constitution of 1814, when the Norwegian people knew they were making history, 
and France, in Paris, on August 1, 1789, when the French people had the feeling that the 
world history, through the postulate “l’abolition du régime féodal” was seriously changing.  
E-mail from Michael Stolleis, Former Director of the Max-Planck Institute for European 
Legal History, to the author (Feb. 14, 2014) (on file with the Marquette Law Review). 
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aura of abstraction113 and ambiguity and, especially, by a sort of 
insurmountable disconnection with immediate practices of social life, 
even though needing to “bear some resemblance to fact.”114  
Constitutionalism needs to work with some fictions and abstractions, 
even to methodologically justify many of its premises.115  In Edmund 
Morgan’s words, it requires “make-believe” and the “willing suspension 
of disbelief.”116  In the core of the words legitimacy and citizenry, we find 
the concept of people, which is by far one of the most controversial in 
constitutional literature,117 and certainly one that represents such an 
abstraction from reality118 that many people and their real struggles for 
 
113.  The abstraction of those concepts can lead to the fallacy of composition or the 
fallacy of division.  As Adrian Vermeule argues, “a great deal of constitutional theory and 
analysis goes wrong by overlooking that constitutional orders are two-level systems of this 
sort.  Analysts uncritically assume that institutions must have the properties of their members, 
or that an overall constitutional order must have the properties of its component institutions.”  
VERMEULE, supra note 18, at 5. 
114.  EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR 
SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 14 (1988) (“[I]n order to be viable, in order to 
serve its purpose, whatever that purpose may be, a fiction must bear some resemblance to 
fact.”). 
115.  See id. 
116.  Id. at 13. 
117.  See how Jacques Derrida examines the insurmountable circularity at the core of 
the act of foundation of a new order, how the retrospective perspective of the people acting 
during those moments is part of the legitimation process of a political framework.  There is, in 
those moments, what he calls the “mystical foundation of authority,” i.e., the foundation 
could not be deemed legal or illegal; however, it shall give, although practicing some violence, 
an aura of legality and legitimacy through the signature, as if it were the expression of self-
evident laws.  These self-evident laws agree with the people represented by the signature.  See 
Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority,” 11 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 919, 943 (1990).  See contra Sheyla Benhabib, Democracy and Difference: Reflections on 
the Metapolitics of Lyotard and Derrida, in THE DERRIDA-HABERMAS READER 128, 142 
(Lasse Thomassen ed. 2006) (“[T]his focus on the act of foundation is extremely distorting for 
it ignores the institutional and historical learning processes which ‘really existing democracies’ 
have gone through.”). 
118.  Indeed, who are the real people during those moments?  If we examine, for 
example, the Brazilian Constitutional Assembly of 1987–1988, where different groups of 
society actively participated in the debates, the strategic behavior of the elites were clearly 
represented and vigorously acted to avoid some democratic breakthroughs in favor of some 
minority groups.  This leads to the question: Why will those groups, originally excluded from 
the debates during the Constitutional Assembly, abide by the rules and principles of the 
constitution?  See generally BARBOSA, supra note 96, at 204–37 (arguing that, in spite of the 
elites’ strategic behavior during the Constituent Assembly, the process of constitution-making 
was clearly marked by popular participation); Denise Rollemberg, Memória, Opinião e 
Cultura Política: A Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil sob a Ditadura (1964–1974) [Memory, 
Opinion and Political Culture: The Brazilian Bar Association and the Dictatorship (1964–
1974)], in MODERNIDADES ALTERNATIVAS 57, 57–96 (Daniel Aarão Reis & Denis Rolland 
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recognition during those moments are not taken into account.119  
Institution, in turn, is certainly one of those concepts whose meaning 
differs radically depending on which discipline or theory is under 
consideration.120  
Still, it is not the purpose of this Article to deeply discuss the 
different nuances of those concepts.  As was the case of constitutional 
moments, both the matter of legitimacy and the matter of institutional 
dialogue with the citizenry are to be regarded in a much less ambitious 
way.  Indeed, to deconstruct the magical aura that normally flows from 
constitutional concepts as such, the itinerary here is more prosaic.  It 
thus focuses on simple facts of social life, on how people behave when 
challenged by circumstances that might directly affect their lives, as what 
happens when political or economic breakdowns or crises lead them to 
call for a change.  
Interaction is a key premise here.  Much of human behavior is rather 
 
eds., 2008) (explaining how the Brazilian Bar Association supported the beginning of the 
military regime); Frances Hagopian & Scott Mainwaring, Democracy in Brazil: Problems and 
Prospects, 4 WORLD POL’Y J. 485, 486 (1987) (arguing that, after the transition to democracy, 
the “political arrangements represent a mix of democratic procedure and authoritarian 
practice”); Andrei Koerner & Lígia Barros de Freitas, O Supremo na Constituinte e a 
Constituinte no Supremo [The Supreme Court in the Constituent Assembly and the Constituent 
Assembly in the Supreme Court], 88 LUA NOVA 141 (2013) (showing how the Brazilian 
Supreme Court acted to keep untouched their Justices’ privileges during the Constitutional 
Assembly); Maria José de Rezende, A Lógica Autoritária do Regime Militar e os Cálculos 
para Controlar a Democratização: A Análise do Jurista Raymundo Faoro sobre o Processo 
Político Brasileiro [The Authoritarian Mindset of the Military Regime and the Calculations to 
Control the Democratization: The Jurist Raymundo Faoro’s Analysis of the Brazilian Political 
Process], 5 REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE CIÊNCIA POLÍTICA 167, 167–92 (2011) (showing how 
the military regime made use of many mechanisms to control the process of transition to 
democracy); Maria José de Rezende, Raymundo Faoro e os Enigmas da Transição Política no 
Início da Década de 1980 no Brasil [Raymundo Faoro and the Enigmas of the Political 
Transition in the Beginning of the 1980s in Brazil], 42 REVISTA DE CIÊNCIAS HUMANAS 165, 
165 (2008) (“[T]he political process [kept], inside itself, elements that were capable of making 
state practices to be perpetuated.”). 
119.  See AXEL HONNETH, THE STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION: THE MORAL 
GRAMMAR OF SOCIAL CONFLICTS 1 (Joel Anderson trans., 1995) (introducing a model of a 
“struggle for recognition” as “the foundation for a social theory with normative content”). 
120.  See Terry M. Moe, Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story, 6 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 213, 213 (1990) (conceptualizing political institutions as “the structural means 
by which political winners pursue their own interests, often at the great expense of political 
losers”); Underhill Moore, Rational Basis of Legal Institutions, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 609 
(1923) (“A legal institution is the happening over and over again of the same kind of 
behavior.”); Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 97 (1991) (“Institutions are 
the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction.”). 
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conditioned, even unconsciously, to expand its comfort zone.121  It 
demands less energy, less effort, less direct involvement when things go 
as planned.  Predictability and stability make life easier; order and 
certainty prevent unpleasant surprises.  If a person knows beforehand 
what the probable consequences of her actions are, she can more 
effectively prepare for them, use the necessary tools to face any 
difficulty that may arise, establish mechanisms to dilute risks, build 
bridges to take advantage of positive benefits, etc.  In a broader 
dimension, she can take steps in the face of those consequences to 
maximize her position in the social environment, or, at least, to avoid 
diminishing the one she already owns.  As a member of society, she will 
act as to make her wishes become true, sometimes strategically placing 
her private interests above those of the public in general, sometimes 
strategically or discursively interacting with others in order to obtain 
certain benefits or even to simply help the others uninterestedly (even 
though indirectly receiving some benefit, such as social recognition, 
religious commitment, individual satisfaction, etc.).  But, in any case, her 
actions tend to keep or expand her comfort zone.  
History shows that cooperative interactions through impersonal 
institutional frameworks tend to promote the so-desired stability and 
predictability that are able to transform society in a way that enables the 
political, economic, and, naturally, social forces to engender virtuous and 
self-enhancing practices directed to the interests of all.122  In this 
scenario, each individual will find, in the great benefits of cooperative 
interaction, an efficient mechanism to keep or expand her comfort zone.  
Strategically, individuals will make agreements or follow certain rules, 
even when they might not achieve their immediate desired outcome, as 
long as they realize that not making or following them could yield more 
unfavorable consequences in the long run.123  In a broader sense, society 
 
121.  Alina Tugend, Tiptoeing Out of One’s Comfort Zone (and of Course, Back In), 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2011, at B6. 
122.  See North, supra note 120, at 98 (“[E]ffective institutions raise the benefits of 
cooperative solutions or the costs of defection, to use game theoretic terms.”); see also 
Levinson, supra note 31, at 730–31 (indicating how decision-making institutions act to 
“[increase] the benefits of coordination and cooperation and therefore the costs of 
noncoordination and defection”). 
123.  This is what Darryl Levinson calls the beneficial effects of coordination.  
According to him, 
[i]n many contexts, social groups with otherwise divergent interests can achieve 
common benefits from coordinating their actions or expectations. . . . n the purest 
form of a coordination game, social groups care only about the fact of settlement, 
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will adopt this mechanism as a means of self-improvement and self-
preservation, transforming individual and strategic interests into 
coordinated procedures that will promote democratic stability and 
predictability.124  Rule-makers, rule-enforcers, and rule-followers will 
coordinate their normally conflictive interests and actions in order to 
reach stability and predictability, with possible gains to everyone.125  The 
consequence is, quoting Barry Weingast, “a set of mass behaviors that 
create a ‘civic culture,’ including a consensus on values and stable 
democracy.”126  Stability and predictability through impersonal 
institutional frameworks then become a strong argument in favor of 
keeping and expanding the comfort zone of democratic societies, a 
necessity due to its complexity and pluralism.   
Obviously, in order for the different ways of interaction to take place, 
some form of regulation of individual behavior has to be laid down.  
 
not about how, substantively, the issue is settled.  But coordination can also be 
effective when actors have divergent preferences about outcomes or about 
institutions for resolving these outcome-oriented disagreements.  Each actor will 
obviously prefer the arrangement most likely to further its own interests.  
Nonetheless, in many contexts actors will be willing to sacrifice their first choices of 
outcomes or institutions in exchange for the benefits of avoiding conflict and 
agreeing on a common way forward.  The higher the costs of unresolved 
disagreement—in the currency of political or violent conflict, or the inability to 
carry through on collective action and achieve collective goods—the greater the 
coordination benefits of any institutional settlement.  Likewise, the greater the costs 
of recoordinating on a different settlement, the more resilient we should expect 
current institutional arrangements to be.  Institutional arrangements that are costly 
to set up and costly to do without will be protected by substantial coordination 
buffers.  
Id. at 683–84. 
124.  According to Barry R. Weingast, 
[a]lthough scholars have tended to focus exclusively on one or the other, my 
approach suggests that both are necessary to understand democratic stability.  It is 
elites who choose whether to construct pacts, initiate democratization, violate 
citizen rights, and implement public policies.  Mass behavior is relevant to elite 
choices because it determines part of elite incentives.  In a society that has resolved 
its coordination problems, citizens hold the power to threaten political elites with 
loss of power if they violate agreed limits on government.  When citizens have failed 
to resolve their coordination problems, however, some violations of citizen rights 
will go unpunished.  Citizen values and elite interests are thus complementary 
aspects of democratic stability.  
Barry R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 245, 261 (1997). 
125.  Id. at 246. 
126.  Id.  
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Legal norms and contracts, for example, become institutional 
frameworks that allow society to maintain a certain necessary order and 
certainty for keeping or expanding its comfort zone, constraining 
individuals to act as planned, or, to use a systemic theoretical approach, 
to “protect[] expectations,”127 thereby promoting “counterfactual 
stability.”128  Likewise, the constitution represents an instrument that, by 
placing itself as the highest norm, functions as a gravitational institution 
of other institutions, reinforcing the legal system in itself and protecting 
society from the paradoxical “self-destructive tendencies” of 
democracy.129  By the same token, “constitutionalism is a system of 
systems,” springing from complex interactions among institutions and, at 
a lower level, individuals.130  Constitutionalism thus emerges as a sort of 
impersonal institutional framework whereby cooperative interactions 
can occur more efficiently for the purpose of promoting stability and 
predictability within the context of plural and complex societies.  In 
other words, it keeps and expands the comfort zone of society.131  
 
127.  Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 136, 140 (1989) (“[I]n 
that it protects expectations, the law frees us from the demand that we learn from 
disappointments and adjust to them.”).  
128.  Id. (“From the sociological point of view, normativity is nothing but counterfactual 
stability.”).  
129.  See Gert Verschraegen, Human Rights and Modern Society: A Sociological 
Analysis from the Perspective of Systems Theory, 29 J.L. SOC’Y 258, 258 (2002) (“Human 
rights are considered as a social institution, whereby modern society protects its own structure 
against self-destructive tendencies.”). 
130.  See VERMEULE, supra note 18, at 27. 
131.  This conclusion does not deny that promoting stability and predictability, even in 
the context of plural and complex societies, could also mean a certain defense of the 
maintenance of the status quo against the possibility of more radical changes in the structure 
of society.  This is a serious and relevant point to the argument presented here.  Indeed, if we 
take the history of constitutionalism in different worldwide realities, we could see that many 
constitutions were drafted, and rights and benefits were therein incorporated, somehow as a 
consequence of a negotiation between distinct elite groups and not exactly of the exercise of 
popular sovereignty during those constitutional moments.  Therefore, keeping stability and 
predictability could also mean preventing the dominant structures of society from being 
disrupted by more radical changes.  See David L. Epstein et al., Democratic Transitions, 50 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 551, 566–67 (2006) (explaining how “partial democracies” behave in 
democratic transitions); Adam Przeworski, Democracy as an Equilibrium, 125 PUB. CHOICE 
253, 253–73 (2005) (explaining how the democratic culture provides equilibrium for the 
stability of constitutional orders).  However, although this observation is true, it does not 
contradict the premise that, in complex and plural societies, it is imperative that the rules of 
the game constitutionalism brings forth shall represent a focal point where those individuals, 
with their different conceptions of the good, can get along with each other.  Rawl’s concept of 
“reflective equilibrium,” which leads to the idea of adjusting those different conceptions of 
the good until they are in “equilibrium,” and thereby achieving a sense of justice that might 
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Nonetheless, no matter how sound and efficient a constitution is for 
those purposes, it is ontologically dependent on the support of society.  
There is no constitution, at least one able to promote stability and 
predictability within the context of plural and complex societies, unless 
people uphold and share its norms and principles.  Evidently, we are not 
denying that, in a sense, constitutions also exist in authoritarian 
backgrounds and even with great public support;132 however, they are 
normally anchored to personalistic or coercive means that structurally 
contradict the premise of complexity and pluralism.133  In democratic 
constitutionalism, on the other hand, the fragility and instability that are 
at the core of democracy itself are always there as a threat to 
constitutionalism and, consequently, to the very democracy.  But they 
are also paradoxically there as a condition of preservation and 
functioning of constitutionalism and democracy.  This instability and 
fragility simultaneously constrain and enable democratic 
constitutionalism.  As Jacques Derrida says, “democracy protects itself 
and maintains itself precisely by limiting and threatening itself.”134  
Constitutionalism then becomes the “Other” of democracy, opening 
it up for the future, which is, nonetheless, uncertain.  Between both, there 
 
provide some stability, is an important argument in this matter.  See John Rawls, The Idea of 
an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 10 (1987).  Moreover, while, at the 
constitutional level, the idea of “reflective equilibrium” provides some stability to the distinct 
conceptions of the good, at the institutional level, those rules of the game constitutionalism 
brings forth emerge as an important instrument for economic development.  See North, supra 
note 120, at 109–12.  This is a paradox: On the one hand, promoting stability and 
predictability might mean maintaining the status quo against more radical changes; on the 
other, promoting stability and predictability might also mean providing the tools for social, 
economic and institutional development.  How both perspectives will cope with each other is 
unknown and depends on each context. 
132.  See DENISE ROLLEMBERG & SAMANTHA VIZ QUADRAT, A CONSTRUÇÃO 
SOCIAL DOS REGIMES AUTORITÁRIOS: LEGITIMIDADE, CONSENSO E CONSENTIMENTO NO 
SÉCULO XX: BRASIL E AMÉRICA LATINA [THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES: LEGITIMACY, CONSENSUS AND CONSENT IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY: BRAZIL AND LATIN AMERICA] 11–32 (2010) (showing how some authoritarian 
regimes had great social support); David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 189, 201 (2013) (indicating how popularity plays a special role in semi-authoritarian 
regimes which make use of abusive constitutionalism) [hereinafter Landau, Abusive 
Constitutionalism]; David Landau, Constitution-Making Gone Wrong, 64 ALA. L. REV, 923, 
934 (2012) (arguing that a high degree of popular participation within a weak institutional 
system might impair democracy) [hereinafter Landau, Constitution-Making Gone Wrong]. 
133.  Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser, Introduction, in CONSTITUTIONS IN 
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 7 (Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser ed., 2014). 
134.  JACQUES DERRIDA, ROGUES: TWO ESSAYS ON REASON 36 (Pascale-Anne Brault 
& Michael Naas trans., 2005). 
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is a permanent and deferred negotiation marked by an always-remained 
undecidability, and this is indeed the condition of constitutional 
history.135  For without this interaction between constitutionalism and 
democracy, the very dynamics of time is jeopardized in favor of other 
sorts of domination, such as authoritarian coercion, strategic 
relationships in which “force is exercised by one against others,”136 or 
totalitarian tendencies of different spheres of society137 that affect the 
individual and social autonomy.138  In a constitutional democracy, human 
rights appear instead as a protection of individuals and as a guarantee of 
freedom of discourses against those types of coercion.139  This is the 
reason why one is mutually ground of—and alterable by—the other: 
“Constitutionalism must be at once iterable by (because the ground of) 
and alterable by (because the product of) democracy.”140 
Without public support, accordingly, there is no sense in sustaining 
the existence of democratic constitutionalism because there are no 
people upholding its premises.  After all, democracy relates to the 
sovereignty of the people responsible for continuously interpreting and 
shaping the constitution, thereby bestowing its legitimacy.  On the other 
hand, constitutionalism defines how people will exercise their rights and 
duties by submitting them to the rule of law and basic rights.  The matter 
of legitimacy and the matter of institutional dialogue with the citizenry 
are, in this negotiation between constitutionalism and democracy, 
directly represented.  
 
135.  See Derrida, supra note 117, at 1043 (arguing that this undecidability derives “from 
the fact one could not distinguish between founding violence and conserving violence”); see 
also JULIANO ZAIDEN BENVINDO, ON THE LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION: 
DECONSTRUCTING BALANCING AND JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 182 (2010) (arguing that the 
relationship between democracy and constitutionalism is marked by an insurmountable 
undecidability). 
136.  Jürgen Habermas, A Reply to My Critics, in HABERMAS: CRITICAL DEBATES 219, 
269 (John B. Thompson & David Held eds., 1982). 
137.  See Verschraegen, supra note 129, at 258 (“Human rights are considered as a social 
institution, whereby modern society protects its own structure against self-destructive 
tendencies.”). 
138.  See Christoph Beat Graber & Gunther Teubner, Art and Money: Constitutional 
Rights in the Private Sphere?, 18 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 61, 61 (1998) (“[A] discursive 
concept of constitutional rights should be directed against any social system with totalizing 
tendencies.”). 
139.  Id. 
140.  Lasse Thomassen, ‘A Bizarre, Even Opaque Practice’: Habermas on 
Constitutionalism and Democracy, in THE DERRIDA-HABERMAS READER 176, 185 (Lasse 
Thomassen ed., 2006).  
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Yet, people must be interpreted in a broad sense, involving naturally 
the rule-follower, rule-enforcer, and the rule-maker, all of them 
addressees of the constitution.  Therefore, the different spheres of 
society—politics, economy, media, science, religion, etc.—have to be 
committed to following the constitutional principles as a condition of 
preserving them as social spheres of a democratic society.  This naturally 
implies hard choices, and even unpopular ones, for sometimes an 
expressive part of the people and the constitution are in opposite sides.  
They may desire an immediate response of the criminal system in case of 
a crime, but the constitution demands that the criminal system function 
according to the due process of law, which makes an eventual judgment 
a result of a presumably prudent and skillful analysis and the 
consequence of a time-demanding procedure.  They may wish to change 
the electoral system in the year of elections as to make ineligible 
possible candidates whose pasts, according to many people, are marked 
by homophobic and racist behavior, while the constitution forbids 
changes as such in the electoral year141 and, to make the case even more 
complex, prescribes freedom of speech as a basic right (which, in this 
case, may be in conflict with equality rights).142  In these and other 
circumstances, constitutionalism limits and paradoxically enables 
democracy.143  The question, however, is this: To what extent does this 
equilibrium or negotiation remain possible? 
D. The Prosaic Nature of Precommitments and the Fragility of Self-
Binding  
The risks are that, because of the very fragility of constitutional 
democracy, a skewed equilibrium emerges.  Examples are many.  It is 
well known, for instance, that Carl Schmitt’s “identity of ruler and ruled, 
governing and governed, commander and follower”144 leads to a clearly 
authoritarian concept of democracy based on “the general identity and 
homogeneity of the people.”145  But it is the “subtler” forms of skewed 
 
141.  See U.S. CONST. art. V; CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 60, 
§ 2 (Braz.). 
142.  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
143.  See STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF 
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 136 (1995) (“[C]onstitutionalism and democracy are often mutually 
supportive.”). 
144.  CARL SCHMITT, VERFASSUNGSLEHRE [CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY] 234 (2010).  
145.  Id. at 235.  
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equilibrium that gain momentum nowadays.146  This occurs, for example, 
when practices disrupt, in distinct areas of social life, the cooperative 
interactions through impersonal institutional frameworks.147  In these 
circumstances, stability and predictability, qualities of a society that aims 
at keeping and expanding its comfort zone (especially in the 
circumstance of fragility and instability of complex and plural societies) 
are no longer promoted by the adequate functioning of impersonal 
institutions, as the constitution itself.  “Personalistic” relationships 
dominate instead every corner of society, which inevitably leads to 
structural instability and unpredictability at some point.148  As a 
consequence, the social forces lose their ability to engender self-
enhancing practices directed to the interests of all, either because they 
are controlled and coercively constrained or because they lose faith in 
how institutions operate.149  
This is, in fact, the perfect scenario for what David Landau calls 
“abusive constitutionalism,” that is “the use of mechanisms of 
constitutional change—constitutional amendment and constitutional 
replacement—to undermine democracy.”150  Or what Steven Levitsky 
and Lucan A. Way define as “competitive authoritarianism,” that is 
“regimes [that] are competitive in that opposition parties use democratic 
institutions to contest seriously for power, but they are not democratic 
because the playing field is heavily skewed in favor of incumbents.”151  
Therefore, instead of promoting a radical change through a coup d’état, 
changes are made using the very constitutionalism, thus creating an 
authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regime that has the appearance of a 
democratic order.152  In this case, by examining these regimes through a 
systemic view, constitutional mechanisms that should be used to 
reinforce democracy are weakened in favor of rules that prove self-
undermining over time, that is “rules [that] tend to select a corps of 
officeholders who work to undermine or destabilize the rules 
 
146.  See Przeworski, supra note 131, at 253. 
147.  See North, supra note 120, at 110. 
148.  See id. at 111. 
149.  Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, supra note 132, at 191. 
150.  Id. (arguing that, in such cases, “[p]owerful incumbent presidents and parties can 
engineer constitutional change so as to make themselves very difficult to dislodge and so as to 
defuse institutions such as courts that are intended to check their exercises as power”). 
151.  STEVEN LEVITSKY & LUCAN A. WAY, COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM: 
HYBRID REGIMES AFTER THE COLD WAR 5 (2010). 
152.  See Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, supra note 132, at 189. 
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themselves.”153  History, in fact, is full of examples of how democracy and 
constitutionalism were radically left aside in favor of authoritarianisms 
or semi-authoritarianisms, many of them with huge popular support.154  
In the same way, there are plenty of examples of how the prevalence of 
personalistic relationships led to erratic political, economic, and social 
developments, making stability and predictability a distant promise.155 
Nonetheless, it is necessary to understand the solution to the 
equilibrium or negotiation between constitutionalism and democracy in 
a completely different viewpoint.  Instead of looking at solutions that do 
destroy democratic constitutionalism, we should look at those that keep 
it alive and make it even more dynamic.  In other words, we should ask: 
Why do constitution and democracy keep being intimately related—and 
fortify themselves as such—even in those circumstances in which it 
really seems they are heading towards mutual suicide?  Why do 
people—rule-followers, rule-makers, and rule-enforcers alike—still 
believe in constitutional democracy and abide by its norms and 
principles when it directly affects their most immediate wishes?  
As might be expected, normative arguments appear to answer those 
questions.156  The concept of constitutional moments, as we have seen, 
arises in this context: The period of higher lawmaking becomes the 
source of normative assumptions that will influence the generations 
ahead and thereby the people at a certain point, when normal 
lawmaking takes place, are not legitimate to promote such changes in 
the constitutional order.157  They have instead to be committed to those 
principles, even when they challenge their most intimate desires.  Still, 
this belief in those normative assumptions as a possible answer to the 
stability of societies seems rather overstated.  They might be seen as a 
persuading and even “rational” (against our emotive reactions to those 
circumstances) response to those dilemmas and, thus, an efficient 
 
153.  VERMEULE, supra note 18, at 102. 
154.  See Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, supra note 132, at 189. 
155.  See DARON ACEMOGLU & JAMES A. ROBINSON, WHY NATIONS FAIL: THE 
ORIGINS OF POWER, PROSPERITY, AND POVERTY 73–76 (2012) (indicating that extractive 
institutions are one of the main reasons for poverty in the nations); Landau, Constitution-
Making Gone Wrong, supra note 132, at 923 (indicating the risks of quasi-authoritarianism 
when assemblies are left unconstrained and institutions do not act as they should); North, 
supra note 120, at 111 (indicating how personalistic relationships play a relevant role in 
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156.  See supra Part II.C. 
157.  Jon Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come to It: Some Ambiguities and 
Complexities of Precommitment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1759 (2003). 
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intergenerational argument against immediate changes.158  They assume 
somehow the symbolic figure of a tradition that ought to be respected 
because they have borne considerably good fruit throughout history.159  
However, it is quite evident that other causes are much more structural 
regarding the maintenance of a constitutional order because, if those 
people really want the change, there is no normative assumption that 
will stop them from promoting it, even if the result is to put 
constitutional democracy in jeopardy.  This is the inherent fragility and 
instability of democracy, but it is also what makes it so challenging.  
As already mentioned, instead of relying on those normative 
assumptions, it is interesting to discuss some more prosaic aspects of 
social life that might best explain why the people commit themselves to 
the constitution, why they uphold its principles and rules, and why they 
follow it, even when their deepest wishes tell them not to do it.  The idea 
of precommitment or “self-binding” has been a central topic of relevant 
studies on social behavior, and they can certainly shed some light on this 
discussion.160  Jon Elster, who has devoted many of his works to this 
theme,161 examining both individual and collective precommitments, sees 
in the constitution a type of collective self-binding that is “quite 
fragile,”162 especially because it is based on a “virtual representation” of 
a generation towards the future ones and also because not all framer’s 
preferences have the quality of intergenerational relevance.163  The 
founding generation expects the future generations to abide by the rules 
and principles of the constitution.  Continuous changes, after all, contrast 
with a stable and predictable institutional framework, and this can 
seriously impair cooperative interactions and, consequently, the comfort 
zone of societies.  In Elster’s view, it is rational to “prevent wasteful 
investments in constitutional change by majorities that fluctuate around 
fifty percent,” especially with regards to “a standing concern which can 
be assumed to be important for all generations.”164  This is one of the 
reasons why techniques such as the requirement of supermajorities to 
 
158.  Id. at 1755. 
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162.  Elster, supra note 157, at 1758. 
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amend the constitutional text, an institutional design based on the 
separation of powers, time-demanding deliberation procedures (to cool 
down immediate passions),165 and entrenchment of judicial review turn 
into paramount characteristics of constitutionalism.166  However, those 
techniques are still very fragile inasmuch as “there is nothing external to 
society” that could promote the binding force of the constitution.167  
In any case, notwithstanding the fragility and instability of this sort of 
collective precommitment—which is, indeed, an insurmountable feature 
of constitutional democracy—there are naturally some mechanisms that 
can foster constitutional binding.  Usually, as we see in those 
explanations on how certain periods of constitutional history could be 
regarded as constitutional moments, popular mobilization, and 
involvement towards the elaboration and interpretation of the 
constitution, on the one hand, and gathering, filtering, and resolving 
those popular claims through institutional mechanisms, on the other, 
appear as premises of that concept.168  Both the matter of legitimacy and 
the matter of institutional dialogue with the citizenry are part of this 
qualification. 
People and institutions come together to build a new world, at least 
one that corresponds to the people’s claims, on the one hand, and one 
that results from gathering, filtering, and resolving those claims 
according to an institutional framework, on the other.  There is the 
coordination of the people’s wishes and demands via institutions in 
order to reach a comfort zone that can promote democratic stability and 
predictability, bringing benefits to all.169  As Stephen Holmes says, 
“constitutions not only limit power and prevent tyranny, they also 
construct power, guide it to socially desirable ends, and prevent chaos 
and private oppression.”170  In a stable democratic society, where the 
matter of legitimacy and the matter of institutional dialogue with the 
citizenry are working well together, following the constitution, a 
powerful impersonal institutional framework, has many benefits.  
 
165.  See id. at 1765; see also Richard Albert, Amending Constitutional Amendment 
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166.  See Albert, supra note 165 (arguing that constitutional amendment rules should be 
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167.  Elster, supra note 157, at 1760. 
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On the other hand, the functioning of cooperative interactions for 
the sake of constitutional democracy is, nonetheless, marked by, using 
Jon Elster’s terminology, a mixture of passion, interest, and reason.171  In 
fact, usually many of those so-called constitutional moments stem from 
radical regime transitions, from dictatorships to democracies, from 
colonies to new nations, from old constitutions to new constitutions 
(either formally or informally).172  This is why Elster’s argument that 
there is a “striking contradiction”173 when we use the constitution as a 
tool for cooling down future generations’ passions, bringing them back 
to reason, goes straight to the point: constitutions—and this applies also 
to constitutional moments—are not usually what we could call the best 
example of reasoned decisions, derived from exhaustive and thoughtful 
political, economic, and social reflection.174  So why do we keep 
following the past?  Why do we, reasonable people, commit ourselves to 
passions, interests, and reasons of those moments? 
Passions naturally have a very persuading effect, especially in the 
short-term.  People, when they see the response to their claims been 
given, it does not really matter whether it was the consequence of a 
reasoned, interested or passionate decision.  They simply want to have it 
done as fast as possible.  Constitutions, in any case, usually are not 
capable of giving immediate response to these claims.175  They may 
immediately provide a new institutional design, new mechanisms of 
popular participation, new rights and benefits, but even in these cases, it 
will probably take some time until they become part of a stable 
constitutional culture.  
For example, the Brazilian Constitution of 1988, as it was drafted, 
already established a radical transformation in many aspects of social 
life, especially in what refers to some practices from the prior period of 
dictatorship (1964–1985).176  In addition to expanding the bill of rights 
that could already be enforced (freedom rights, equality rights, etc.), it 
also provided many institutional mechanisms that were there to make 
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democracy a reality (elections, participation rights, etc.).177  It also 
rearranged the way institutions worked for the sake of society according 
to this new democratic paradigm.178  The Brazilian people were eager to 
live in this new reality, even though there were strong popular 
mobilizations during the Constitutional Assembly.179  In fact, the 
Constitutional Assembly of 1987–1988 was marked by the absence of a 
hegemonic block that could dictate the paths of the new constitution, 
and this paved the way for “an intensive and influential participation of 
organized civil society, a phenomenon of unique magnitude in Brazilian 
history.”180  The time of the constitution then accelerated in an 
unpredictable way.181  Yet, this time, as magical as it might have been, 
was also a promise, a deferred promise.  It was not as fast as to meet 
everyone’s wishes.182  After all, the constitution was elaborated before 
Brazil had already an institutional and democratic practice, let alone a 
political culture within this context.183  Even with all this legitimate 
procedure of lawmaking, one that we can see clearly the matter of 
legitimacy and the matter of institutional dialogue with the citizenry 
working side by side, it was not enough, as it never is.  
It provided nevertheless a symbolic effect towards the future.  
Regardless of whether those decisions were based on the passions, 
interests, or reasons of this transition to democracy, the fact is that it 
created a sort of binding in the following generations.184  The way 
citizens and institutions managed to settle and coordinate their 
inevitable disputes yielded the positive outcome of certain stability and 
predictability as never before in Brazil.  There is, of course, somehow a 
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still authoritarian heritage in the Brazilian contemporary reality, such as 
personal relationships that produce erratic social, political, and 
economic consequences; elite groups opposing policies aimed at 
decreasing poverty; and including historically oppressed and 
disadvantaged social groups; and difficulties in implementing certain 
basic rights, among others, but none of them seems, at least at this point, 
to structurally jeopardize the main conquests of the constitution.185  
Accordingly, legitimacy and institutional dialogue with the citizenry, 
when working well together, can indeed have some relevance to the 
binding effect of constitutions.  The legitimate procedure of constitution-
making in Brazil, marked by a relative strong pluralism and a visible 
claim to making a new country, provided the tools that might explain, at 
least at the political level, why some institutional stability has been 
achieved since then.  Still, constitutionalism is naturally a process with 
ups and downs, and, even though that special period of higher 
lawmaking really brought a new horizon of possibilities, time is crucial 
here.  On the one hand, there is the inertial effect of following the rules 
that are working well for most of the people.186  On the other, 
cooperative interactions through impersonal institutions become more 
coordinated among the different social actors,187 thereby creating 
“institutional arrangements [that] both facilitate compromise and blunt 
the incentives of political losers to defect.”188  Or because the costs of 
changing the constitution are higher than leaving things alone, time 
catalyzes stability when things go somehow as planned.  As a 
consequence, “[c]hange becomes psychologically and socially costly, hard 
to understand or envision, and normatively dubious.”189  
Time also makes passion-based decisions more difficult to 
implement structural changes in the constitution when the matter of 
legitimacy and the matter of institutional dialogue with the citizenry are 
present.190  For instance, Dilma Roussef’s proposal that June 2013 for a 
plebiscite that would establish a sort of “fast track” procedure for 
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constitutional amendment regarding the political reform, as a reaction to 
the popular demonstrations during the FIFA Confederations Cup, could 
have been more easily implemented in 1994 than right after those 
demonstrations.191  Some of the popular claims really resulted from the 
inobservance of basic rights as laid down in the constitution of 1988 
(right to quality public transport, right to non-discrimination) or from 
some structurally problematic constitutional provisions (the electoral 
system of representation, for example), and indeed it would be much 
simpler to implement some of those changes without all the strict 
procedure of amendment.192  Yet, the simple suggestion of promoting a 
structural constitutional change without following the procedures for 
constitutional amendments lost momentum after a couple of days,193 not 
because there was no constitutional moment at that time, as some 
suggested,194 but simply because it would demand so much energy and 
political mobilization that it was not worthwhile.  The immediate 
reaction of different sectors of society, such as legal experts,195 Justices of 
the Brazilian Supreme Court,196 and political parties,197 was a clear sign 
that this could not take place easily.  
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There were, after all, other painless mechanisms to promote some 
changes, even if not as efficient as a “fast track” procedure.198  The costs 
of affecting the procedural rules of amendment as set out in the 
constitution, even as an exception, were higher than seeking 
alternatives.199  Moreover, time produced the effects of first cooling 
down the passion-based arguments manifested during those 
demonstrations (time in the short term) and second recalling the 
memory of the relevance of stability and predictability of following the 
procedural rules of the constitution as an instrument against arbitrary 
rulings and as a protection of democracy, even in circumstances as such 
(time in the long term).200  Certainly, other more prosaic causes played a 
special role here, such as the lack of interest of a substantial number of 
congressmen to mobilize for a change that would affect their comfort 
zones, the undemanding psychological effect of leaving things alone, or 
the inertial effect that, after about twenty-five years of democratic 
constitutionalism, made the institutions rather vaccinated against sudden 
actions to the detriment of the constitutional rules that regulate them 
and the people.201  Changes, therefore, should be made by playing the 
rules of the game and not by making those rules a game.  
On the other hand, changing the rules of the game every time groups 
of people go to the streets demanding change is counterintuitive and 
costly.  After all, the impersonal institutional framework laid down by 
the constitution can be replaced by a sort of personal relationship 
between the government and the people.  Popular uprisings, which are 
usually marked by short-lived passions,202 can be followed not by reason 
but by an interested-based strategy of the government.203  The 
constitution becomes a milestone in the struggle for something new, and 
the government, in turn, becomes the great agent for change.  A sort of 
personal relationship with the people replaces the impersonal 
institutional dialogue with the citizenry.  These are, again, the 
circumstances in which we see the occurrence of “abusive 
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constitutionalism”204 or “competitive authoritarianism.”205  
But this is also the case whereby institutions, as “humanly devised 
constraints that structure political, economic, and social interaction,” 
lose their ability to create order and reduce uncertainty, affecting 
directly cooperative interactions among distinct sectors of society.206  If 
this is so, it can create the snowball effect of expanding inefficient 
institutions and policies in the future, spoiling the gains society has 
achieved so far.207  Following the constitution, in this circumstance, turns 
into a condition of self-preservation of democracy but also of 
maintaining certain gains in political, economic, and social area, and this 
certainly counts as a strong element of self-binding.  It might have taken, 
after all, a huge effort and time to establish a new constitutional order as 
a constitutional culture, and it might have involved a great amount of 
energy and work to establish the necessary confidence to improve 
political, economic, and social behavior for the well-being of the people. 
Naturally, this conclusion neither denies the fragility of this 
precommitment to the constitution nor sustains the conservative 
argument that no change in the rules of the game could be positive 
whatsoever.  After all, precommitments can indeed represent an 
interested-based strategy of the status quo.208  This is not the point here, 
though.  The question is why people keep following the constitution 
even in situations in which their wishes tell them not to do so.  Aspects 
such as the benefits of impersonal institutional frameworks; cooperative 
interactions coordinating contrasting human behaviors; the inertial 
effect of time; the high political, economic, social costs of change; the 
self-learning process in favor of constitutional democracy; the memory 
of an authoritarian past that is just right there and is not welcome at all; 
the tendency of human behavior to keep and expand its comfort zone as 
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well to be unwilling to take risks; and the human behavior in favor of 
actions based on reason instead of interests and passions, among many 
others, all of them help answer this question.209  None of them, however, 
prevents those people from leaving aside the constitution if they really 
intend to do so, especially if institutions in dialogue with the citizenry 
(they are unable to transpose their demands into institutional actions), 
and are bringing to the end the possibilities of any concession as regards 
their legitimacy.210 
E. The Stabilizing Behavior of Constitutions 
For this reason, the constitution does have a stabilizing behavior over 
time.  If the constitution relies on a political commitment, if it seeks to 
dialogue with the citizenry, if it intends to keep being legitimate, it has to 
be at each given moment and context both the old and the new 
constitution.  The constitution has to be the past, the present, and the 
future altogether.  After all, the constitution is not simply a text but a 
back-and-forth process, an ongoing movement of moments, a permanent 
transition of temporalities.  No constitutional moment is thus more 
special than other moments. 
Even if we do believe in the transcendent qualities of a history that is 
to remain in everyone’s minds, even if we do share the common grounds 
of what makes us people, nothing denies the prosaic conclusion that 
those moments are just moments.  They might be the result of vigorous 
political commitments, the mobilizing effect of the people toward a new 
temporality, the consequence of a strong desire for change.  They may 
also have the confluence of numerous factors that make them relevant 
for constitutional history, for bringing a fresh impetus to society, for 
paving the way for new horizons and possibilities.  In short, they may 
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make the constitution constitutions, show how temporalities build new 
temporalities, and expose how constitutions transform their meanings 
throughout history.  Still, prosaically speaking, they are just outcomes of 
human behavior.  As incredible and magical as they seem, they do not 
have the power to be more than simple political commitments, nor do 
they have the ability to prevent future political commitments if people 
really mean to do so.  
In any case, if the matter of legitimacy and the matter of institutional 
dialogue with the citizenry are working well together, new political 
commitments may not seem necessary, as we have seen.211  The 
constitution, after all, has a stabilizing behavior over time, and as a back-
and-forth process, it can adapt to new temporalities and therefrom build 
new temporalities.  Not only through the formal procedure of 
constitutional amendment212 but also by means of a new constitutional 
meaning due to a change in interpretation,213 a constitutional 
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 2015] THE SEEDS OF CHANGE 407 
convention,214 desuetude,215 or political consensus, the constitution 
changes.  As a powerful impersonal institutional framework, it can 
establish a fruitful dialogue with the citizenry, bringing about 
mechanisms that strengthen cooperative interactions and elevate the 
costs of change, among other causes.  More importantly, it can establish 
the self-learning positive effect of popular commitment to its rules and 
principles, developing a constitutional democratic culture that should 
remain in force for many years ahead.216  
Therefore, in order for a constitutional democracy to succeed, its 
stabilizing behavior must connect to the people’s claims but also make 
popular commitment to its rules and principles a longstanding and 
shared practice.  Constitutional democracy thus produces a 
“performative meaning” that is there “in the course of applying, 
interpreting, and supplementing constitutional norms.”217  The tense and 
dynamic paradox of constitutionalism and democracy, with all the risks 
involved in this negotiation, is itself a producer of stability and 
predictability, of keeping and expanding the comfort zone of society.218  
Hence, the paradox is not only limited to the structural conflictive 
negotiation between democracy and constitutionalism, between 
legitimacy and the institutional dialogue with the citizenry.  It also 
affects the very characteristics of this negotiation: the tense, risky, and 
fragile feature of constitutional democracy is itself cause and 
consequence of the stability and predictability of constitutional 
democracy and of keeping and expanding the comfort zone of society.  
“Constitutional democracy is the most humane political system because 
it thrives on the ability of individuals and communities to recognize their 
own mistakes.”219 
 
214.  See Albert, supra note 172, at 387 (“[W]ritten constitutions change informally as a 
result of the development of an unwritten Constitutional norm, otherwise known as a 
constitutional convention.”). 
215.  See Richard Albert, Constitutional Amendment by Constitutional Desuetude, 62 
AM. J. COMP. L. 641, 641 (2014) (“Informal amendment by constitutional desuetude occurs 
when a constitutional provision loses its biding force upon political actors as a result of its 
conscious sustained nonuse and public repudiation by political actors.”); see also Richard 
Albert, Constitutional Disuse or Desuetude: The Case of Article V, 94 B.U. L. REV, 1029, 1029 
(2014) (“Article V of the United States Constitution is in decline and disuse.”).  
216.  See Habermas, supra note 19, at 775 (arguing how the intergenerational feature of 
the constitution provides a self-learning positive effects of popular commitment to its 
principles). 
217.  Id. 
218.  Id. 
219.  HOLMES, supra note 143, at 177. 
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However, if the matter of legitimacy and the matter of institutional 
dialogue with the citizenry are, nevertheless, going through a wave of 
disruption and crisis, that political commitment might become unviable.  
Maybe the institutional framework is not working anymore; maybe the 
cooperative interactions cannot coordinate any longer contrasting 
human behaviors; maybe time has made that constitution overly 
outdated to meet today’s demands;220 maybe its mechanisms of 
adaptation to new contexts reached a saturation point that has no 
further possible compromise; or maybe the costs for change are not as 
high as before.  In short, the constitution loses its ability to construct new 
temporalities or, in other words, its stabilizing behavior is incapable of 
adapting to new contexts.  
In this circumstance, there is no constitutional moment that remains, 
no matter how originally democratic it was.  Its “performative meaning” 
is not able anymore to prevent it from the “coming” of a new order.  
Contrary to other times, when the political process gives to the 
supporters of this regime “sufficient power to fend off attacks from 
opponents,”221 the insurmountable power of the people transforms the 
constitutional order, with all its binding force, into an inconvenient and 
bothersome commitment.  In this case, institutions, as impersonal as they 
might be, are not recognized as legitimate “humanly devised constraints 
that structure political, economic and social interactions,”222 nor can they 
fruitfully dialogue with the citizenry.  A new beginning is beginning.  
Even so, this new beginning is just a moment marked by the inherent 
controversies and dilemmas of human behavior.  It might result in a new 
political commitment, one that modifies many of the previous 
assumptions and the way institutions and people dialogue with each 
other.  How it will evolve from that time onwards is uncertain.  Perhaps 
an authoritarian force is afoot; perhaps it is just a rearrangement of a 
constitutional culture toward enhancing democracy by other means.  In 
 
220.  This is a paradox, according to Daryl Levinson, 
enduring constitutional rules and arrangements will tend to become both 
increasingly dysfunctional and increasingly difficult to change over time.  This 
paradox arises because the political dynamics that entrench institutional 
arrangements operate independently of both the initial motives for establishing 
these arrangements and the arrangements’ ongoing functional justifications. 
Levinson, supra note 31, at 714. 
221.  Id. at 704. 
222.  North, supra note 120, at 97. 
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any event, its qualities of constitutional moment, such as the matter of 
legitimacy and the matter of institutional dialogue with the citizenry, do 
not deviate it from the prosaic conclusion that it is a simple political 
commitment.  It does not bind the future, although it might yield some 
sort of fragile precommitment and self-binding by reason of other 
aspects of human behavior, as we have seen.223  It does not mean a 
special moment incomparable to any other, for the constitution is a 
back-and-forth process that is itself a complexity of moments.  
Still—and this is the conclusive crucial point—in spite of the fragility 
and the complexity of temporalities a constitution bears, the so-called 
constitutional moments might indeed have something to say.  This might 
go beyond the idea that constitutional moments are the result of a 
strong popular mobilization, when the people are eager for a new 
beginning, or that they transform the dialogue between institutions and 
the citizenry, developing therefrom a new constitutional culture.  
Perhaps they say something because they unveil the deferred promise 
constitutional democracy is.  It is a performative utterance that exceeds 
the reality where it expresses itself, showing that this reality never fulfills 
the promise but that, in doing so, it paradoxically prints on it the 
“impossibility of stopping.”224  In other words, those constitutional 
moments might show the very impossibility of constitutional democracy, 
an impossibility that is nonetheless the very possibility of constitutional 
democracy.  This paradox, however, may mean the very denial of those 
constitutional moments, at least as usually the legal literature uses it.225  
By unveiling the impossibility of the promise, those constitutional 
moments become then just moments, a reality that is never there.  
F. The Paradoxical Nature of Constitutional Moments 
As we have seen, a constitution is an ongoing movement of 
moments, a permanent transition of temporalities, a back-and-forth 
process.  As such, if it succeeds, a constitution is itself a set of 
constitutional moments.  In each of these moments, there is what Jacques 
Derrida, using Montaigne and Pascal’s words, calls the “mystical 
foundation of authority,”226 i.e., we cannot find, in any of them, a ground 
 
223.  See Elster, supra note 157, at 1758 (“[T]he idea of collective precommitment 
emerges as quite fragile.”).  
224.  DERRIDA, supra note 25, at 13. 
225.  See supra Part II.A. 
226.  Derrida, supra note 117, at 943. 
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or a foundation “[s]ince the origin of authority, the foundation or 
ground, the position of the law can’t by definition rest on anything but 
themselves, they are themselves a violence without ground.”227  
Therefore, these moments show up as the very living constitution, they 
reveal this never-stopping negotiation between the reality, where we find 
ourselves, and the promise that never arrives but which is there to make 
constitutional democracy a possibility in its very impossibility.  
Accordingly, there is no sense in saying that they bind the future, nor 
that they disrupt the past as to whether what has happened so far has no 
future.  They are not the masters of the constitutional time, nor are they 
the ground of other moments, for there is no causality in the complexity 
of temporalities constitutional democracy is.  Nothing guarantees the 
future; nothing is capable of keeping the past as permanence or of 
erasing the past as forgetfulness; nothing overcomes the fragility of all 
temporalities.  Those constitutional moments, if they can be qualified as 
such, merely reveal the indefatigable and incessant process of invention 
and reinterpretation of the constitution.  They only show the critical 
perspective that constitutions cannot be seen as stabilized over time. 
If a constitution, as a powerful impersonal institutional framework, 
promotes stability and predictability, it only does so by being itself this 
tireless negotiation between this promise that never comes—but which 
is there to make constitutional democracy possible—and the reality that 
aims at keeping its comfort zone, a reality where the matter of legitimacy 
and the matter of institutional dialogue with the citizenry are working 
well together.  Moments such as Ackerman’s constitutional moments, the 
turning point in constitutionalism in Canada and France, the different 
constitutional movements in Europe, the Constitutional Assembly of 
1987–1988 in Brazil, among many others, are clear examples of this 
incessant negotiation.  They may have represented the peak of popular 
mobilization.  Still, they were not a sort of “magical entity” transforming 
the future into their then-original future, nor did they make the people 
during those periods more than simple people.  They have not 
suspended the inherent fragilities and strategic behavior of human 
beings, nor have they turned constitutions into something more than a 
political commitment.  On the other hand, they might have inscribed in 
people’s minds the very meaning of constitutionalism; they might have 
stamped in people’s actions this ongoing tense, fragile, albeit 
indispensable, and necessary, negotiation.  In short, they, as a sort of 
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performative utterance, might have made evident constitutional 
democracy as this “experience of the impossible.”228  
We follow the constitution for different reasons, and we change the 
constitution as a result of other reasons, many of them not so romantic 
as we have seen.  A metaphysical standpoint in the concept of 
constitutional moments, such as some of those assumptions we discussed 
previously,229 thus can blind us to this intrinsic characteristic of human 
behavior.  They are not the ground, as we have argued, but merely 
history, violence, and belief.  They are just facts full of complexities and 
contradictions.  However, for being so full of history and making history, 
they unveil the performative feature of constitutional democracy, which 
goes beyond those facts themselves.  
This performative utterance yields a principle of political legitimacy, 
which becomes a “weapon aimed at the enemies of democracy.”230  No 
one will deny that Ackerman’s constitutional moments, the 
Constitutional Assembly of 1987–1988 in Brazil, and so on, give meaning 
to what we mean by constitutional democracy, creating a memory within 
the context of many temporalities that protect constitutional democracy.  
Naturally, as we have discussed, many prosaic aspects of social life are 
central here for this purpose and explain a lot this precommitment 
throughout generations.  Yet, constitutional democracy, while going on 
by reinventing itself in its very repetition throughout history, while being 
this continuous negotiation between the promise and the reality, protects 
itself against its disruption.  Its fragility is thus, paradoxically, its 
guarantee.  Its performative feature is thus, paradoxically, its very reality.  
This conclusion leads us inevitably to the question: Is there any sense 
in still insisting that we have some constitutional moments in our 
histories?  If the answer is affirmative, those constitutional moments are 
as such qualified merely because they might remind us of this promise, 
this negotiation that takes place throughout history.  They are moments 
as such simply for being full of history, violence, and faith.  At the most, 
as Jack Balkin says, we would have a “faith in the constitutional project, 
which is also a faith in its redemption throughout history.”231  Therefore, 
temporality is in its utmost expression.  But this is also the very denial of 
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that celebratory concept of constitutional moment.232  What remains, in 
the end, is aporia, myth.  Paradoxically or not, this aporetic condition is 
what makes history so relevant.  Constitutional moments thus elevate 
history. 
III. POPULAR PROTESTS AS CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENTS? 
A. Introduction  
We are thereby led to the conclusion that, if those constitutional 
moments say many things—after all, they are history and make history—
they might not say all those things.  Precommitments as those of 
constitutional democracies are always marked by dilemmas, paradoxes, 
and expectations.  Moreover, as we have seen, they are continuously 
challenged by facts of social life that can, naturally, undermine the very 
features of constitutional democracy.  From explicit authoritarian 
regimes to other “subtler” forms of authoritarian practices, such as what 
the legal literature calls “abusive constitutionalism,”233 “competitive 
authoritarianism,”234 “stealth authoritarianism,”235 and the like, the 
differences may not be that high, and the democratic assurances we have 
may be much more fragile than they seem.  This is why it is important to 
interpret those constitutional moments in a prosaic approach by 
stressing, more than the magical aura and normative assumptions usually 
associated with them, the two elements introduced before: the matter of 
legitimacy and the matter of institutional dialogue with the citizenry.  
They certainly do not say everything, but at least they shape that idea of 
constitutional moments in a much less celebratory fashion,236 allowing us 
to investigate how institutions and the people themselves behave and 
coordinate their activities in their everyday political life.  With these two 
simple elements in mind, we can better understand how the people get 
involved in building their constitution, the rules and principles that 
govern them, on one hand, and also how institutions gather, filter, and 
resolve the distinct popular claims, on the other.  Briefly, institutions—
and the constitution as a powerful impersonal institutional framework—
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and the people are mutually cooperating, with reciprocal gains, and over 
time, these ties become stronger. 
All the same, this combination of factors implies important analyses 
of real causes that engender those distinct behaviors and interactions in 
constitutional democracies.  This is obviously not a simple task, for it 
would demand discussions of institutional design, institutional capacities, 
systemic effects, and so on, which goes way beyond the scope of this 
Article.237  My goal is, therefore, much less ambitious.  I will use some of 
the previous conclusions about constitutional moments prosaically 
interpreted to examine a particular type of phenomenon: popular 
protests whose outcomes are paradoxical.  In empirically examining how 
those mass protests impact constitutionalism, the purpose is to bring that 
theoretical discussion of the previous part to the very reality of social 
life.  More importantly, when we deeply investigate those popular 
uprisings, we conclude that that celebratory idea of constitutional 
moments Bruce Ackerman and his followers hold needs some 
refinement.238   
The mass protests of June 2013 in Brazil, when the FIFA 
Confederations Cup was taking place, will be the prime example for this 
purpose.  This case will not only empirically allow broadening the scope 
of the discussion of the concept of constitutional moments but also 
provide a rich debate over the endurance of a democratic system when it 
has to face such challenges.  The analysis will, however, not be limited to 
those popular protests.  In fact, although June 2013 is paradigmatic when 
it comes to the configuration of mass protests that strongly have an 
effect on constitutional and political institutions, some significant 
associations with other popular uprisings worldwide are possible.  The 
question is: Why has the constitutional literature interpreted those mass 
protests as if they were not constitutional moments?239  With this 
question in mind, ultimately, my goal is to reveal how both the concept 
of constitutional moments and the debate over the endurance of 
constitutional democracies are closely intertwined.  As for the seeds of 
change, my argument will reveal that those events are indeed 
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constitutional moments and play a special role in the very endurance of 
constitutional democracies.   
B. The Popular Protests of 2013 in a Comparative Perspective: When 
Constitutional Moments Face the Systemic Analysis 
In June 2013, Brazil was faced with an interesting but intriguing 
phenomenon.  During the FIFA Confederations Cup that June, more 
than one million people thronged the streets of many cities all over the 
country with a wide variety of grievances and agendas.240  Mass protests 
became suddenly a routine without any leadership or specific demand.  
The amorphous and diffuse agendas, many clearly aimed at cross-
purposes, dominated the scenario, from calls for justice for oppressed 
social groups to banning gay marriage; from specific claims such as the 
hike in bus fares to generalities like traditional politics or corruption.241  
The social catharsis caught the attention of many in Brazil and different 
parts of the globe by surprise and rapidly came under the spotlight from 
the international media.  Many that viewed Brazil as a relevant example 
of a rising democracy that has born good fruits in the last decades and 
that has achieved many goals virtually unthinkable before were 
intrigued by the phenomenon.242  
The moment was also very sensible: the matches of the FIFA 
Confederations Cup were just happening while the streets outside the 
stadiums were thronged with thousands of people from everywhere.243  
Violence naturally erupted in many circumstances and the police 
reaction, with rubber bullets and tear gas to scatter the crowd, was 
disastrous, especially in the beginning of those movements.244  All this 
mixture of social catharsis, violence, and the FIFA Confederations Cup 
was explosive.  In the beginning, it was the hike in public transport fares 
that caused it, but in the end, the general agenda prevailed.245  
Corruption, human rights in general, the political system, decrying 
inflation, poor allocation of public funds, privatization of government 
services, all different agendas were raised, many of them conflicting with 
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each other.246  The New York Times argued that “Brazil now seems to be 
pivoting toward a new phase of interaction between demonstrators and 
political leaders with its wave of protests,”247 and many saw in those 
demonstrations the sign of a new political culture in Brazil, with new 
actors and new demands for rights.248 
Nevertheless, the outcomes of those mass protests might have been 
rather disappointing.  Although some political leaders immediately 
attempted to respond to those protests, nothing structural seems to have 
changed at first sight.  President Dilma Roussef rapidly claimed on 
national television the need of a “fast track” procedure of constitutional 
amendment with a previous plebiscite for the purpose of promoting a 
political reform.249  But this proposal failed.  In the beginning, Congress 
reacted by saying that a plebiscite would not be possible for the 
complexity of the subject and that it would be best to have a referendum 
instead.250  Then, as things calmed down, the idea just disappeared for a 
while from the public debate.  After Dilma Roussef’s reelection in 2014, 
one of her agendas is political reform.251  Although this proposal has lost 
steam since her election, the idea of a plebiscite and possibly through a 
sort of “fast track” procedure of constitutional amendment could 
naturally come up again.  Still, her second term has just begun, and 
reactions against this agenda are already noticeable.252  Especially with a 
Congress more conservative than the previous one, which is a paradox 
after those mass protests,253 and amid a political turmoil,254 there is little 
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chance of success in this matter.255   
The mass protests of 2013, even though being regarded as an 
expression of democracy and social participation, were thereby beaten 
by the structural reality of Brazilian political institutions.  In addition, 
signs of the strategic behavior of the elites to capitalize on that moment, 
promoting their agendas, were after all largely present.256  As those 
movements moved forward, the shift from a specific claim, such as the 
canceling of bus-fare increases to a generalized, diffuse, and unfocused 
one, strongly encouraged by the press and the new media, made those 
movements easily ripe for co-option.  That environment of social 
catharsis validated any claims, and consequently, the elites could seize 
control of the movement in general while reaffirming their traditional 
values.257  It is no wonder that, right after those events, the following 
elections of the Brazilian Congress in 2014 were characterized by the 
expansion of the conservative right.258  The new Congress elected could 
observe an increase of congressmen from military, religious, rural, and 
other typically conservative groups in an incomparable proportion with 
any other period since the transition to democracy.259  The elites, 
although threatened by these movements, could thereby keep untouched 
or even expand their power and influence.260  
Those mass protests of June 2013 represent a perfect configuration 
of a type of popular uprising with paradoxical outcomes, not seemingly 
affecting constitutionalism as deep as it should to be qualified as a 
constitutional moment.  Still, the Brazilian example is just one among 
many.  History is full of examples of popular demonstrations whose 
immediate outcomes fell short of expectations, even though in the 
middle to long run they might have engendered some relevant changes.  
This is particularly true when it comes to elections, for example.  In 
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1968, de Gaulle and his right-wing coalition won a landslide victory in 
the French Parliament after the famous mass demonstrations that 
May.261  Although one could argue that those events “transformed the 
popular image of socialism in France,”262 it also proved that, 
notwithstanding the spontaneity and the good ideas of those protests, in 
the end, de Gaulle was able enough to circumvent the opposition and 
guarantee his victory.263  One could even argue that those protests 
“produced few coherent policy proposals, left a disorganized and 
almost-collapsed movement in its wake, and led to an enlarged 
conservative majority and a dispirited and divided opposition[.]”264  A 
window for reform was nonetheless open but only when that wave of 
protests died down and some bargaining with the conservative 
reformists took place.265  
In the United States, despite the economic meltdown in 2007–2008 
and many protests such as Occupy Wall Street in 2011 in the streets of 
New York and other American cities, the aftereffects of those events 
were also paradoxical.  As a movement characterized by “radical politics 
of inclusion”266 and a “form of living constitution in itself”267 that 
challenges how traditional social movements behave,268 its potential to 
create a momentum for change is noticeable.  However, even though its 
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demands were raised in the very process of building consensus,269 and its 
core slogan—“We are the 99%”—pointed to general claims against 
inequality and injustice,270 those protests were also followed by a 
conservative backlash.  The subsequent American congressional 
elections were marked by the growth of polarization between 
Republicans and Democrats.271  There was also the expansion of right-
wing political groups connected to movements such as the Tea Party,272 
which also took advantage of the public ire over Wall Street in order to 
defend a radical program of fiscal austerity and expand the attacks over 
marginalized groups and minorities.273  On the other hand, whether 
inspired or not by those protests, President Barack Obama’s 
administration has made some moves to lessen income and social 
inequality, despite this increase in political polarization.274 
Also in 2011, Spain underwent a right-wing takeover of its 
Parliament275 despite thousands of students—the “Indignados”—
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protesting against the economic crisis.276  Like Occupy Wall Street, the 
“Indignados” started as a “collective political practice[] testing forms of 
non-representationist democracy . . . .”277  Amid a serious economic 
crisis and a discredited political system, the movement rapidly gained 
momentum with thousands of people thronging the streets of many 
cities in Spain,278 providing a very interesting example of expressive 
popular response through a “broad frame of ‘real democracy’ within 
social networks.”279  After it had dispersed, this movement started 
building some solidarity networks and setting up mechanisms of direct 
participation, such as neighborhood assemblies.280  Yet, as it happened 
with the Occupy Wall Street movement, some doubts were raised about 
whether the “indignados” could effectively transform the “abstract and 
purely political notions of ‘real democracy’”281 into practice by 
politically institutionalizing its various agendas.282  In this case, albeit the 
immediate paradoxical outcome of those protests, the “indignados” 
movement may have been more successful in the medium-long term.  
The 2015 general elections, unlike the previous one, substantially 
changed the political landscape.  The longstanding two-party system was 
clearly affected by the growth of the “new politics”283 represented by the 
parties Ciudadanos and, above all, Podemos, a structured political 
organization originated from the “indignados” movement.284  This 
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outcome has certainly upset the balance of power, and now the main 
challenge has been how to harmonize these “new politics”’ own 
conflicting agendas, keep its multiple groups following a coherent 
political platform,285 and negotiate its claims with a still strong “old” 
politics.  
Therefore, these examples show that, although the links between 
mass protests and subsequent political changes in democracies have 
been much discussed by legal scholars and political scientists,286 one 
cannot overlook their immediate paradoxical outcomes and their 
effective impacts on constitutionalism.  After all, these moments, now 
prosaically construed, can engender distinct arrangements in the very 
structure of constitutionalism and its institutions.287  
For example, in a systemic viewpoint according to which individual 
interactions may not necessarily correspond to how institutions and, 
even more broadly, constitutionalism behave, this paradoxical outcome 
is what may effectively change the constitutional reality.288  Perhaps it 
can be this strategic behavior of the elites combined with other opposite 
radical actions of distinct social groups that provides some gains and 
benefits both at the institutional and constitutional levels.  Perhaps, 
without this pluralism of positions, institutional constraints and 
constitutional thresholds would be much more fragile and flexible to 
adapt to the interests of a specific group.  In the specific case of those 
mass protests of June 2013, paradoxically or not, despite congressmen 
defending their very political interests and, therefore, acting against the 
idea of a “fast track” procedure for constitutional amendment, in the 
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end, this can lead to the need of following the rules of the game and of a 
much greater debate over the so-desired changes, which, in turn, would 
exactly correspond to what is expected, at a constitutional level, for a 
constitutional amendment.289  A similar analogy can be drawn from the 
other popular protests discussed above, and in fact some of the so-
expected changes that have become reality might have stemmed from a 
greater coordination of plural interests.  Interactions, some controversial 
at the individual level, may yield coherence and consistency at the 
institutional level, whose interactions can or cannot bring about similar 
effects at the constitutional level.290  
This argument leads us to the conclusion that what is at stake is the 
very paradoxical nature of the negotiation between constitutionalism 
and democracy, and how pluralism plays a special role in paving the 
ground for strengthening constitutionalism and its institutions.  Those 
movements such as the Brazilian mass protests of June 2013, the 
demonstrations of May 1968 in France, Occupy Wall Street in New York 
in 2011, the “Indignados” in Spain in 2011, can be a clear sign of this 
increasing pluralism that might engender, in the long term, 
unpredictable results.  For the way interactions will take place varies 
constantly, and the results, if apparently frustrating at first sight, might 
engender positive outcomes in a broader dimension of systemic analysis.  
The constitution, as a form of precommitment, will be followed and 
changed by distinct prosaic factors, many of them stemming from 
strategic behavior of the elites and other social groups but also from 
other forms of interactions taking place at the institutional level.  
Therefore, people and institutions will work well together, bringing forth 
the positive effect of the learning curve of democratic life, as long as 
pluralism at all levels is kept alive.  Those protests might not have 
immediately brought about effective changes in constitutionalism and 
political institutions.  And, as such, they might not be regarded as 
constitutional moments.  Still this argument may give just one side of the 
story. 
C. The Other Side of the Story: The Matter of Legitimacy and the Matter 
of Institutional Dialogue with the Citizenry 
If we shift focus, maybe we can tell the other side of the story.  True, 
most of the frustrating outcomes of those social uprisings stem from the 
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strategic behavior of political elites.  Particularly regarding those 
Brazilian popular demonstrations of June 2013, the political inertia, 
especially by congress, was a consequence of a direct strategic 
intervention of the elites.291  This is particularly evident when they 
exploded in an unfocused, leaderless, and generalized way.292  One could 
also argue that the disappointing results were also a symptom of a series 
of factors, such as the contradictory left-wing policy under influence of 
neoliberalism,293 the influence of the right-wing media, the unfulfilled 
expectations even after years of economic growth,294 and the “atrophy of 
traditional forms of social representation.”295  Many of these arguments 
would validate the idea that those mass protests of June 2013, like the 
others discussed above, were not constitutional moments at all.296  
However, if we examine those protests in a systemic and prosaic 
perspective, the other side of the story emerges.  As previously 
mentioned, during those mass protests of June 2013, there was a huge 
popular pressure for change, and particularly change in the political 
system, which is now supported by the government.297  On the other 
hand, congress has since then been relatively divided on how these 
changes should come about.298  If they support some changes, possibly 
there are many controversies on how to promote them.  For example, 
the idea of making the change through a sort of “fast track” procedure 
of constitutional amendment, as the government indicated, has naturally 
many supporters in congress and in the streets, but as history shows, this 
might be more difficult than planned.299  In the end, this pluralistic 
conflict of opinions might bring about a change in the political system as 
a result of a stronger dialogue.  
Furthermore, those protests, even though not immediately yielding 
the so-desired outcomes, have naturally showcased how fundamental 
aspects of democracy, such as freedom of speech and political 
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expression, are vital to the integrity of institutions.  They might also have 
proved that the constitution can serve as a tool for, or impediment to, 
political change.  In other words, they might have revealed the 
pedagogical value of democracy and constitutionalism, how institutions 
and individuals behave during periods of crisis, and how history—
indeed, constitutional history—is elevated during those moments.  These 
aspects cause effective impacts on how the interactions at all levels take 
place and can enhance this “performative meaning” constitutional 
democracy yields over time.   
The results of all those protests are obviously unpredictable, for 
constitutional democracies are continuously challenged and put at risk.  
Yet, the fact that the matter of legitimacy and the matter of the 
institutional dialogue with the citizenry has already bore good fruits in 
Brazil, the odds are that, after those protests, some important changes 
can happen despite the rigid procedural rules for constitutional 
amendment.  Good signs of this are already visible, such as an increase in 
policy monitoring mechanisms and accountability and, possibly, the 
strengthening of the culture of popular mobilization for change.300  In 
addition, the Brazilian Supreme Court has also promoted a more active 
control—sometimes controversially—of political activities, thereby 
increasing the mechanisms of institutional constraint.301  Therefore, in 
such a controversial territory, the results might be a greater level of 
pluralistic interactions among the distinct institutions and individuals,302 
reinforcing, ultimately, the Brazilian constitutional democracy and 
strengthening its endurance to face such challenges.  Although the elites 
have somehow seized control of the movement, especially when the 
diffuse and general agenda gained momentum, and the immediate 
outcomes were rather frustrating, there were relevant gains and benefits 
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for Brazilian constitutional democracy in a broader perspective.  Those 
mass protests, in many different ways, might have enhanced pluralism in 
the way interactions take place at all levels. 
This is why, if it is to interpret those protests as constitutional 
moments, they should somehow refine Ackerman’s celebratory 
conception of constitution moments.  Those normative criteria do not 
seem to fully gather the complexities that are usually involved in this 
equation.  In fact, those mass protests of June 2013 as well as the other 
examples discussed here show the increasing curve of democratic living 
and captures the “performative meaning” their constitutional histories 
have provided.  In contrast to the argument that they were not 
constitutional moments because they could not further structural 
changes in constitutionalism, the opposite conclusion is more likely.  In 
many of them, certainly political bargains kept untouched privileges and 
interests of the elites and weakened political representation as a clear 
example of a conservative backlash that contradicts many of their claims.  
Still, in a systemic analysis, when this characteristic is combined with the 
increasing democratic curve of popular mobilization and rising pluralism 
while constitutional democracy has consolidated itself, the outcome can 
be more democracy and not the other way around.303  Therefore, those 
popular protests—and many other moments in-between—are part of a 
greater process of constitution-making and constitutional living.  They 
are part of this constitutional moment we are still living. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Bruce Ackerman’s theory of constitutional moments, despite its 
brilliance and impact, misses a deeper appreciation of the nature of mass 
protests that, while not regarded as the core of a constitutional moment, 
may serve as a different inflection point for a constitutional democracy.  
Although being strongly American and based on American history, his 
theory has transcended that reality.  Since its inception, his theory has 
grown wings and the distinct interpretations the constitutional literature 
has promoted of his normative criteria have become the paramount to 
evaluate the occurrence of constitutional moments in distinct realities 
around the world.  Particularly intriguing, though, is that, while 
evaluating distinct realities as if they could comply with the normative 
criteria for being qualified as constitutional moments, the constitutional 
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literature has continuously overlooked the effects and the impacts of 
mass protests and popular uprisings to the very structure of the concept 
of constitutional moments.  
When those moments are prosaically interpreted and their central 
arguments are demystified, new perspectives to examine how 
constitutional reality evolves arise.  After all, the “performative 
meaning” indicates that, albeit the unsurmountable risks of disruption 
democracies bear, facts of social life like those mass protests may 
represent an increasing curve of constitutional living and constitutional 
learning, providing, in the long run, more stability and predictability.  
Despite their paradoxical outcomes, in a clear opposition to many of 
their claims, in the long run, perhaps democracy emerges stronger.  A 
possible increase in the capacity of resisting to some threats of 
disruption and to learn from such challenges can bring about new 
horizons of how to dialogue with the society and to enhance pluralism. 
This is particularly true when we examine the Brazilian case.  Those 
mass protests are nothing other than the consequence of this 
“performative meaning” that gained vitality over the years of 
democratic life.  The rising pluralism Brazil has experienced since the 
movements in the late ‘70s against the civil-military dictatorship, and 
which has echoed in the Constituent Assembly of 1987–1988, in the 
Constitution, and in popular movements such as those of June 2013, has 
increasingly reached the institutional level.  On the one hand, people are 
more actively involved in the destiny of Brazil and naturally more 
conscious of their rights and the mechanisms to protect them.  The 
matter of legitimacy and the matter of institutional dialogue with the 
citizenry have become, while working well together, the main reason for 
this constitutional endurance Brazil now achieved.  From a learning 
process that yielded some “empowerment at the grass-roots level” to the 
“pluralistic distribution of political power,”304  Brazil, while still much 
remains to be done, seems to be heading towards a new future.  
This may sound overly optimistic.  After all, future is uncertain, and 
changes can rapidly occur in a direction that undermines constitutional 
democracy and many of those achievements.  Perhaps in a few months 
or years, these achievements may suffer some regression.  There is no 
guarantee here or turnkey solution, and many of our assurances may fall 
short when push comes to shove.  Even so, when we interpret this history 
by focusing on this prosaic way of political life, by seeing the different 
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moments as relevant but simple moments that cannot hold our future, 
we do more justice to the complexities and dilemmas of constitutional 
democracy.  If we interpret those moments by looking at those 
interactions among individuals and among institutions, we can better 
understand why and how virtuous and self-enhancing practices yield 
those results that are now challenging our future.  The fragility of 
constitutional democracy is counterbalanced by actions and interactions 
of individuals and institutions that can generate this “performative 
meaning” of the constitution that, over time, promotes some stability.  
With this paradox of fragility and stability of democracy and 
constitutionalism, history is unveiled and, along with it, its promises, its 
failures, and its achievements. 
Those mass protests are, with this new perspective, constitutional 
moments, but now prosaically construed.  They are the consequence of a 
much broader phenomenon, which is the very constitutionalism.  They 
derive from a much greater conjunction of different factors that, little by 
little, strengthened pluralism.  They certainly elevate history and made 
us have “faith in the constitutional project, which is also a faith in its 
redemption throughout history.”305  Those mass protests are somehow 
the continuation of this constitutional project, bringing new challenges 
and new achievements with the risks therein involved.  Still, these are 
just moments, like any constitutional moment and, as such, full of history, 
violence, and faith, whereby people build their lives, institutions 
strengthen their designs, and constitutional democracy faces its inherent 
paradoxes and dilemmas.   
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